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INTERNATIONAL

CONTEMPORARY IDEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF ISLAM REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, 1979 signed to press 6 Nov 79
pp 24-35

[Article by A. I. Ionova: "Contemporary Ideological Evolution of Islam
(With the Example of Southeast Asia)"]

[Text] Soviet Orientalists have accomplished a great deal in the area of study of the preconditions for and conditions of the formation of Muslim schools of social thought, as well as the study of Islam in certain countries of Asia and North Africa. A materialist interpretation of the historical process, in combination with ethnographic studies, has made it possible to substantiate the thesis of a reformation process as the general direction of the ideological evolution of Islam during the period of disintegration of traditional feudal and establishment of bourgeois principles in the East. The first Orientalist to do so was M. V. Malyukovskiy.¹ The next step in this direction was taken by S. F. Levin.² Of great importance for conceptual elaboration of the problems of Muslim reformism were the studies of L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya, M. T. Stepanyants, A. B. Belen'kiy, and Z. I. Levin. L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya and M. T. Stepanyants in particular persuasively demonstrated the correctness of application of this term to the transformation of Islam under the influence of emerging capitalism. It was noted that "the Christian and Muslim reformations are in many respect analogous but not identical processes. The differences between them are defined by the specific features of the religious dogma of each of these religious doctrines, by the objective features of development of the societies of the 'world of Islam' in comparison with the Christian world, and by the fundamental dissimilarity between the contemporary era and the era of the European Reformation."³ This statement of the question revealed on the one hand the bankruptcy of the position taken by those Western bourgeois scholars who proceeded from notions of a particular conservatism of the religions of the East and their practically total incapacity for reformist modernization.⁴ On the other hand proof of the existence of general patterns of evolution of various religions, including Islam, showed the error of those who ascribed to Muhammadanism the ability to be the only correct ideology, ensuring victory in the struggle for establishment of a prosperous and just society. At the same time the idea of such an exclusiveness finds extensive response among the Muslim lower strata, who continue today living

in a world of traditional religious preference of "divine" over "human" justice. This is particularly extensively utilized by those Islamic theorists who seek to protect the faithful from the influence of Communist teachings, which contain a genuinely scientific program of realization of the popular ideals of social justice.

Analysis of the political and socioeconomic premises of the reformation of Islam, undertaken by Soviet Orientalists, and its correlation with development of the anticolonial and antifeudal struggle made it possible to register such landmarks of the reformation process as Islamic enlightenment, directed at liberating the consciousness of the masses from the oppressive burden of obsolete concepts and traditions and at adapting it to new conditions, such as the subsequent forming of Islamic currents of the ideology of the national liberation movement. This process was placed in a direct relationship with the specific features of the nationalism of oppressed nations, in such a manner that within the framework of its religious variant religion appears as "one of the forms of nationalistic reaction to colonial enslavement."⁵ It was noted that the reformers applied considerable effort to elaborate "an interpretation of the social and political changes in Muslim society which is acceptable to religious believers,"⁶ in order to achieve "not a formal but actual change in the religious system of values under the pressure of new conditions."⁷ Attention was focused not only on particularly internal but also on external factors, in particular on the fact that, in contrast to the Christian Reformation, the Muslim reformation began in an era of conflict between capitalism and socialism. This in turn predetermined the existence in a number of Islamic doctrines of "theoretical substantiation of a third path of development."⁸

In contrast to the majority of Western Islamic scholars, who reduce questions of the ideology of Islam to theology and who avoid characterizing the actual class content of Muslim nationalist concepts, Soviet scholars took into account the dialectics of the interrelationship between the form, content and social essence of these concepts.⁹ This made it possible to trace the correlation between traditions and innovations, succession and changes in the course of evolution of concepts, and most important, to reveal the dynamics of the ideological-political demarcation of Islamic theorists, particularly bourgeois liberals and petit-bourgeois radicals. The result was clear disclosure of the simplistic approach of a number of Western European and American Islamic specialists toward describing contemporary Muslim trends, schematically subdivided into "modernist" on the one hand and "traditionalist" on the other.¹⁰ Study of various religious-philosophical, political, social and economic Islamic teachings, using materials from India and Pakistan (by A. N. Anikeyev, A. U. Akhmedzyanov, L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya, S. F. Levin, M. T. Stepanyants, N. I. Prigarina, N. G. Prussakova, and others), from the Arab countries (by L. N. Kotlov, R. G. Landa, Z. I. Levin, A. V. Malashenko, M. V. Malyukovskiy, A. V. Sagadeyev, B. G. Seyranyan, Ye. A. Frolova, L. I. Shaydullina, R. M. Sharipova, and others), Indonesia (A. B. Belen'kiy, L. M. Yefimova,

A. F. Korobkov), Turkey (M. Yu. Gasanov, A. D. Zheltyakov, Yu. A. Petrosyan, Yu. I. Rustamov), Iran (G. B. Guseynov, Ye. A. Doroshenko, V. B. Nikitina, and others), as well as other Eastern countries, enables us to isolate an aggregate of ideas and theses which are typologically characteristic of the reformist view and interpretation of vital tasks defined by it. In the confessional-ethical area it is a certain "grounding" of religious prescriptions, a focusing on concern not so much for the beyond as for this earthly world, departure from a traditional interpretation of the ontological and gnoseological aspects of relations between God and man in favor of freedom, even if limited, of expression of volition and personal initiative. In the area of politics it is a rejection of the former absolutization of confessional links and assumption to one degree or another of acknowledgement of the importance of a national community, preaching of civic ideals, substantiation of different variants of "Islamic democracy" with the ever more frequently proclaimed principles of parliamentarianism, republicanism, division of legislative, executive and judicial powers, etc. In the socioeconomic area it is an interpretation of Muslim prescriptions applicable to the tasks of progress in the bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, as well as peasant-plebeian interpretation.

Soviet scholars have noted the nonuniformity of the process of Islamic reformation,¹¹ with principal attention focused not so much on elucidation of its specific features in Sunnism, Shiism, Ismailiya, Ahmadiya and other trends and schools as on the fact that focal areas of reformism arose in different countries in different periods, frequently separated from one another by decades. But this is only one aspect of the question. The other is inseparable from the problems pertaining to the "multiplicity of structure, the existence of a large number of transitional forms, the social fractionality, multistratal nature and relatively stable, persistent character of these phenomena" in developing countries,¹² the fact that "the differing degree of maturation or fading of a specific structure as well as the duration of its historical existence are directly reflected in the social maturity and political countenance of the corresponding class or class stratum."¹³ The point is that everything we have noted above also has an effect on the ideological situation, including the state of contemporary Muslim thought.

Connected with this is not only the fact that in one and the same concepts one and the same form, term, and category are capable of being filled with class content of different types. Also different is the degree of theoretical maturity of ideological trends, the evolution of which takes place on a unified doctrinal foundation. Difference in levels of this maturity in turn affects changes in the essential foundation of teachings, the social nature of which is in principle invariable. The essence of the changes taking place lies in concentration of attention on new problems presented by changing conditions of life, in a different treatment of previous problems, as it were, and frequently in a different reaction as well to other ideological trends. In the final analysis we are dealing with changes of no small importance, which has an effect on the future historical development of given concepts, the force of their social

influence, and their political potential as a whole. The ideological evolution of Islam in the countries of Southeast Asia, in particular, is indicative from this standpoint.¹⁴

The Muslim community in this region comprises an aggregate of social-religious relations of various types. The first elements of this system are linked with the stage of initial class formation, while subsequent elements are connected with traditional-feudal structures, and subsequently with the birth and maturation of capitalism and the elucidation of structural-crisis elements in its development. The actual position of Islam varies from place to place, which is partially the result of the effect of a number of factors which do not always have a direct relationship to the given Muslim community. In spite of the complexity of this problem, which requires special examination, we should note one common tendency: the role of confessional institutions increases appreciably with maturation of feudal relationships and decreases as capitalism evolves, promoting processes of secularization. Internal inhomogeneity and differences in the character and range of vital activity of individual Islamic communities exert influence on the ideological-spiritual countenance of the Muslims of an entire region, of given countries and even localities.

The inertia of persisting stereotypes is greatest where precapitalist relations are still dominant, where taklid (the tradition of strict honoring of the theological authorities of the Islamic Middle Ages, with its scholastic-metaphysical type of philosophy) prevails. According to prominent Philippine reformist (Alukhan) Glang, the general state of such communities is characterized by "lethargy and opposition to any attempt to discard the shroud of dying customs."¹⁵ This fencing oneself off from new ideas, however, does not exclude a response reaction -- conservative and characterized by the endeavor to defend the old principles with every means at hand, a reaction which is negative in respect to any and all innovations. This reaction acquires the greatest force when a precapitalist order is threatened by the bearers of bourgeois relationships, and reformation of Islam becomes the banner of the struggle to modernize the life of the Muslims. Its initial stage corresponds to the period of birth, while the two subsequent periods correspond to the time of maturation and then the time of the structural crisis of the capitalist foundation. It is precisely the reformation process which is today defining the course of evolution of Islamic forms of ideology.

Also characteristic of the beginning of such an evolution is a fairly close attachment to the canons of dogma and the fact that modernization of the latter is inspired not so much by thoughts about the future as by the enthusiasm of struggle against an obsolete social order. Advancing to the forefront is a revision of religious-philosophical principles which challenges the traditional-feudal system and the corresponding system of regulation of the spiritual microclimate in the Islamic community. Such a priority is understandable. "In order for it to be possible to attack existing social relations," noted F. Engels, "it was necessary to strip from them the halo of sanctity."¹⁶

One of the first traditions to be criticized by the reformists was the tradition of blindly following the theological authorities canonized by Islam, a tradition which promoted the repetition of traditional stereotypes of philosophy in their entirety. Placed in contrast to taklid was ijithad, that is, the principle of independent opinion within the boundaries of the instructions of the Koran and Sunna. This permitted the possibility of different variations within the framework of general principles.¹⁷ This opened up the possibility for modernization of Islam, for elaboration of Islamic doctrines, and for increasingly more extensive inclusion of means of ideological influence in the mechanism of regulation of the spiritual life of the faithful. It is true that there already appear at the initial stage certain differences in the ranks of those who would seem to be merging into a single stream of reformation. Most frequently such clashes would come to life during the most general statement of the problems of the future reorganization of society.

The second stage of the reformation process occurs in the period when the question "Who will prevail?" is resolved in favor of those who topple the traditional principles, when an internal struggle is ignited within the ranks of the coalition of advocates of reformation, a struggle which accompanies class-political differentiation of the bourgeois society. Interest in theological-philosophical topics is henceforth entirely determined by attempts to create an all-encompassing "Muslim ideology," at the center of which is political and, to an ever increasing extent, socio-economic subject matter. The narrowness of the dogmatic, even if modernized foundation which is becoming revealed is forcing the reformists to saturate their doctrines with the terminology and certain theses of various secular teachings. Some openly borrow all this from ideas of European and American origin. Others, for various reasons (due to their own attachment to Islamic tradition, a disinclination to enter into direct conflict with it in the eyes of the religious-believer masses, due to identifying the culture of the colonialists with Western civilization, etc), cannot bring themselves to such patent "Westernization," but arm themselves with certain ideas of secular doctrines, first garbing them in Muslim "vestments." As a rule bourgeois pragmatists predominate among the overt "Westernizers," seeking to establish ideological-political collaboration and business contacts with their counterparts in the United States and Western Europe.

The composition of the "anti-Westernizers" is more diversified and includes various social groupings. Situated on the right flank are representatives of conservative bourgeois-landlord circles. Their appeal for the rebirth of Islam does not exclude revision of the traditions of the Muslim Middle Ages in a reformist spirit. The left flank is occupied by petit-bourgeois radicals. Championing the cause of the poor and oppressed, they endeavor to rely on a patriarchal-egalitarian interpretation of early Islamic principles. This subjective traditionalism frequently assumes a "socialistic" hue, as well as, incidentally, the pro-Western modernism of bourgeois theorists. In the final analysis leadership remains in the hands of those ideologists who, openly or with a certain camouflage, advocate the

capitalist path of development. They are favored by the ability to turn to their own benefit the religious-nationalistic narrow-mindedness of the petit-bourgeois radicals, and in addition by the erosion of their ranks as theoretical principles are put to the test in political and class battles. As a result, a portion of the radicals have withdrawn from religion, convinced of the bankruptcy of plans for social reforms connected with it, while others have rejected radical-democratic convictions, shifting to a position of small-proprietor selfishness and cooperation with liberal-conservative Muslim groupings, which could not help but strengthen rightist trends in development of Islamic forms of ideology.

These trends reach their apogee in the third stage of evolution of contemporary Muslim thought. Differences in two areas are noted in it. Leading in one are conservatives, who weaken their modernizer activity, insisting on a partial return to the methods of the taklid. "Closing" the ijithad to the rank-and-file Muslims, however, they fail to apply the same to themselves. This is precisely the reaction of representatives of the exploiter groups to growth of social protest within the lower strata, which at times is manifested in support of the Communist movement and the actions of other democratic forces of non-religious orientation. This also explains the particular vehemence of anti-Communism in the mass propaganda of conservative Islamic groups. The antidemocratic substance of such attacks is camouflaged by discourse about the sanctity of religious designs and the sinful nature of any deviations from them. In the other direction the leading role is played by more pragmatically thinking liberals. They are alarmed primarily by symptoms of the decline of religious belief, especially among the younger generation, which is embracing modern scientific knowledge, as well as among those toiler strata which in the course of the class struggle begin to become liberated from the influence of Muslim parties and clergy. These theorists reject the claims of the propagators of Islam, believing that the sole chance for religion to survive in a "secularized world" lies in preserving it as a moral-value reference point for one's being. With this statement of the problem they once again turn to anti-Communism, supposedly for the purpose of opposing "Godless atheism." The fact that in both these trends the leadership role is played by liberal-conservative theorists does not exclude petit-bourgeois opposition, which manifests dissatisfaction with bourgeois dictate and which frequently expresses the social protest of the Muslim lower classes.

All the foregoing schematically reproduces a general picture of the contemporary evolution of Islamic forms of ideology in the countries of Southeast Asia. The role of factors which are external in respect to the Muslims is not taken into account, for example. And yet it is substantial, especially at the initial stage of reformation. Precisely at this time resistance to innovations on the part of traditionalistically minded strata among religious believers is the strongest and most stubborn, and even the reformists take their leave from the traditional patrimony not without long periods of doubting and vacillation. This departure has become appreciably accelerated under conditions of sovereign development of the countries of this region. The consequences of collapse of the colonial

system have exerted influence: the feudal class and clergy have lost the former support of the colonialists, while both have been stripped of previous opportunities to restrict the influence of those reformist trends, particularly political, the existence of which was viewed as a threat to the interests of the mother country and the colonial edifice of the local aristocracy contained within it. Previously-existing barriers impeding intercourse among the peoples of the East were also demolished. Following World War II emissaries of the "Islamic world" -- Egyptians, Pakistanis, and others, were operating actively in many independent countries of Southeast Asia. Reformists in Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indochina were greatly assisted by their correligionists in Indonesia and Singapore.

An important feature of the contemporary evolution of Islamic forms of ideology, however, both on a regional scale and in individual countries, and sometimes localities, consisted in the fact that nowhere was this process single-line and internally homogeneous. The "insular" character of the reformation in the colonial period had its effect. Its centers, which had appeared in Burma in the latter half of the 19th century and in Singapore, Indonesia and Malaya at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, subsequently developed under differing conditions. While the vanguard detachments of Indonesian reformists began transitioning in the 1920's-1930's from the stage of Muslim enlightenment to the construction of ideological systems, the Singapore, Malayan and Burman reformists did not make this transition until one or two decades later. After World War II the Indonesian Islamic community continued its primacy in Southeast Asia both in total number of those who had been drawn into the reformist movement and by degree of maturity of Islamic thought. But here too there were observed considerable differences in levels of development which were also characteristic of the other communities in the region. In rural areas the rate of renewal of religious belief was slower than in the cities. It was also slow where the population was especially attached to Islamic tradition (in Atjeh, in Western Sumatra). Just as in Burma and Singapore, during the period under scrutiny the reformation process in Indonesia was in the final analysis represented by three stages. The Western Malaysian Muslims were in the first two. The vanguard of Philippine and Thailand Islamic theorists were at the approaches to the second stage. The reformation was only just taking root in Brunei, Arakan, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.

The general situation in the Islamicized areas of this region was such that the inertia of established forms of thinking was beginning to promote not only support of traditionalist but also adoption of modernist elements which had previously been elaborated by foreign or local (in the case of "multiple structure" of the Islamic community) Islam reformists. Hence the phenomenon of diffusion of ideas. On a regional scale in particular, "running ahead" was most evident in Brunei and in the East Malaysian states. It was chiefly a consequence of training of cadres of Muslim intelligentsia in the Islamic educational institutions of Egypt, Pakistan, Singapore, etc.

Exchange of experience and ideas accelerated the pace of the reformation process throughout Southeast Asia. As a result its conceptual outlines became more clearly delineated and there was revealed a typological similarity between local and foreign doctrines, elaboration of which was proceeding in the channel of reformation both of Islam and other religions as well. The more similar the historical-social conditions of development of the teachings proper, the more significant this correspondence was.

The importance of a stage-by-stage approach to study of the ideological problems of contemporary Muhammadanism is also confirmed by analysis of the dynamics of development of its principal theses. An example of this is the question of changes in reformist views of society examined in this article, views connected with rejection of scholastic-static in favor of pragmatic-evolutionistic ideas.

Beginning at the end of the 19th century certain Indian reformers in Burma, and their Indonesian, Singapore and Malayan kindred spirits beginning in the first decade of the 20th century, accused their opponents of stagnation and conservatism, prognosticating their doom: for life moves forward, and those who lag behind are doomed to extinction. The upsurge of the national liberation movement and the increasingly more active participation of the Muslim masses in this movement exerted the strongest influence on these stated views.

Following World War II greater numbers of Muslims displayed interest in the dynamics of social development and disseminated the principle that the foundations of society are subject to change. This interest was supported by the practical business of political struggle as well as by the birth and development of national schools of history and sociology. In addition, many reformists frequently possessed not only a traditional-religious but secular education as well. Indicative in this respect is the example of (Alukhan) Glang, a graduate of the University of Cairo and a historian by training. He interpreted in scientific categories the reasons for the fact that Muslim Filipinos were lagging behind their fellow countrymen and laid a large share of the blame on the dato feudal lords.¹⁸ It is true that this type of thinking is only just being established at the initial stage of the reformation process. And there are frequent cases where in a similar situation some Muslim reformers, such as the Malaysian Jaakub H. Abu Hassan, limit themselves to attacks against the "greediness of certain individuals."¹⁹ During colonial times the majority of heralds of reformism saw the goal of modernization as emulation of "Western models," while during the years of independence there was increasing dissemination of an idea which excluded equating such renewal with "westernization." Alukhan Glang, for example, opposed unqualified acceptance of "Western values and practices." But he was in agreement with the opinion of Princeton University professor Black that modernization is vitally essential, for this is a "process in the course of which historically established institutions adapt to the rapidly changing conditions of life, in which an unprecedented growth of man's knowledge is reflected, growth attending the scientific revolution and

enabling man to control the external environment."²⁰ Jaakub H. Abu Hassan also saw the meaning of progress in modernization. He substantiated his position with reference to the teachings of the noted reformists (Dzhemal ad-Din Afgani, M. Abdo, Rashid Rid), medieval thinker (Ibn Taymiyi), and Abd-al-Wahhab, founder of the Wahhabite movement. Jaakub H. Abu Hassan emphasized that modernization should extend not only to dogma and cult but also to society and state, on the basis of "revolutionary changes in the general context of evolution."²¹ Sabah social commentators A. K. Badaruddin and P. N. Damit were of the opinion that it is not easy to raise the masses to revolution against the outmoded adat, and therefore it is better to resolve this problem gradually, in an evolutionary manner.²² Whatever the differences in details in the final analysis, the heralds of reformation were united by the fact that they linked with the concept of revolution a rapid-paced reorientation to the goals of bourgeois development, and to the concept of evolution -- a somewhat slower advance in the same direction. At the same time in reformist thinking there was increasing recognition of the growing role of the masses in history and acknowledgement of the importance of their active participation in the business of social reforms. The hadith was fairly frequently cited in confirmation of this thesis: "Allah will not alter the destiny of those who do not care for their own fate."

As capitalist relations matured, the reformists -- not without the influence of various secular concepts of European and American origin -- began to draw closer to an understanding of the diversity and unity of the historical process, to partial awareness of its nonreligious stimuli, thus departing from absolutization of theocentric principles. For example, Indonesian theologian Usman el Muhammady and Singapore sociologist Professor S. Hussein Alatas wrote about the development of society by stages. The former wrote about the feudal and capitalist phases, and the latter about the feudal, liberal and socialist. In both cases "Islamic democracy" was proclaimed to be the summit of the latter."²³ Characterizing the social conditionality of historical phenomena, S. Hussein Alatas disputed M. Weber's opinion about the decisive role of Protestant ethics in the formation of European capitalism, drawing attention to the primary nature of corresponding changes in the economic system proper.²⁴ Nevertheless it was emphasized in the course of subsequent deliberations that Islam possesses capabilities to activate the course of bourgeois development which are equal to those of Protestantism. Muhammadanism, noted S. Hussein Alatas, can prepare the "emotional and intellectual soil" for modernization of societal relations. The end conclusion was as follows: "Religion as a whole is capable of supporting and sanctioning recognition of those value criteria which influence the course of affirmation of capitalist relations."²⁵

The opinions of Islamic reformists differed on the question of the goals and methods of social progress, revealing two approaches. Interpretation of such phenomena as revolution and evolution was becoming a touchstone. The liberal-moderate interpretation admitted only evolutionary changes. From this position noted Indonesian bourgeois theorist Bahrum Rangkuti

acknowledged the validity of the theses advanced by K. Marx and F. Engels on the continuity of historical development. He categorically denied, however, that changes in production relations should comprise the essence of radical social upheaval and that class struggle is the motive force of such changes in an antagonistic society, resolving the question of the correlation between spiritual and material factors in the process of history, Bahrum Rangkuti ascribed to Marxism absolutization of the latter to the detriment of the former. In his opinion Islam ably combines both, with the absolute priority of the divine.²⁶

Malaysian historian R. M. Affandi held a similar view. Heaping praise upon the "Islamic revolution," he also wrote about other revolutions ("the American, French, Japanese, the Communist Revolution in Russia, the Scientific and Industrial Revolution in Europe"). He even expressed agreement with the following aphorism of K. Marx: "Revolutions are the locomotives of history." When it came to refining the term "revolutionary reforms," it was elucidated that R. M. Affandi reduced them to reforms aimed at "improvement of status in a society in which justice is lacking." He emphasized that these reforms differ from evolutionary changes only in that they take place more rapidly and their consequences are more significant.²⁷ His end conclusion consisted in the assertion that revolution is impossible without reliance on religion. Otherwise "devastation of the soul and a crisis of society as a whole are inevitable. And this will engender new, even more difficult-to-solve social problems."²⁸

Referring to statements by H. Laski on the economic substance of political changes, Malaysian Muslim theorists (Ali Kh. Akhmad, Abdullakh A. Akhmed, and Ali Abdullakh) acknowledged the significance of material incentive to progress. But this did not prevent them from emphasizing the priority of "spiritual revolution," the principal virtue of which was seen in the fact that, in contrast to the others, it is of a bloodless nature. Only conflict between the active participants of the "spiritual revolution" and those who are passive in their fidelity to the adat was admitted.²⁹

Petit-bourgeois radicals (at the beginning of the 1950's they included prominent Indonesian Muslim leader and statesman (Abikusno Chokrosuyoso), and in the 1950's-beginning of the 1960's -- his follower M. Isa Ansajari and one of the leaders of the antigovernment opposition in Malaysia, (Burkhanuddin al'-Khelmi)) did not share the position of the liberals in regard to the problems of social development. They insisted on the implementation of revolutionary reforms which would be carried out under the slogan: "With the people, in the name of the people, and for the people." In their opinion a guarantee of universal happiness and prosperity, both in the material and spiritual spheres, should constitute the goal of the revolution.³⁰ Making reference to the experience of the French bourgeois revolution, which brought the people neither equality nor fraternity nor liberty, M. Isa Ansajari expressed doubt about the possibility of attaining these goals outside the framework of Islam. He linked with Islamic doctrine the prospects not only of national but also social liberation and its realization with unification of Muslims on "principles of collectivism, excluding individualism and selfishness."³¹

With all their substantial differences, both positions examined above did contain something in common. This common component was an equating of the religious and humanist elements, interpreted as universal-supraclass, inseparable from the confessional community of Muslims.

At the stage of crisis of the capitalist society, the apologists of bourgeois and petty-proprietor interests enter into savage conflict with the Marxist methodology of study of history, with the teachings of historical materialism and with the theory of class struggle. This was essentially their reaction to the increasing attractiveness of the ideas of socialism in the eyes of the Muslim toilers and to frequent instances of refusal by the masses to be obedient to Islamic exploiter circles and a rejection of spiritual humility.

The force of this reaction grew stronger from awareness of the fact that "there is great strength today in little people,"³² since it is precisely they who constitute the "engine of all revolutions recorded on the pages of history."³³ But at this stage as well Islamic ideologists were unable to attain total agreement. The majority took the position of theocentrism and acknowledgement of the integrative essence of religion being exceptionally positive for social stability. Some ideologists openly justified rejection of the theory of class struggle and the revolutionary transformation of society. Indonesian social commentator (Shagiuddin) stated, for example, that "Islam prefers evolution and social peace to revolution and class struggle."³⁴ His fellow countryman, prominent bourgeois leader Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, exalted to the skies the evolutionist conception of (Teyyar de Sharden), seeing its significance in substantiation of man's submissiveness to God's design, aimed at unification of society and the entire universe.³⁵ Indonesian theologians Hamka and Nawawi Jazid prognosticated all kinds of punishments for those who violated the divine design. As they interpreted it, divine will alone determined the process of development from "primitive" to "feudal" society and on to contemporary society. Calamities which fell to the lot of mankind on this road were declared to be punishment sent down by the Most High for disobedience.³⁶ Indonesian theologian and social commentator Muhammad Iljas was a vigorous messenger of anti-Communism. He blamed the "Godless Communists" for all the vices and evil of this world. He particularly castigated Marxists for their supposed acknowledgement of the all-determining role of violence in history. Equating historical materialism with economic determinism, Muhammad Iljas ascribed to Communist teachings underestimation of the significance of the spiritual factor for the life of mankind. Speaking of the exceptional "spirituality" of Islam, he rejected the principle of the forward march of history, asserting that an objective evaluation of the events of the past is practically impossible.³⁷

Some liberal Muslim theorists preferred to attack the Marxist concept of class struggle and revolution in a less open manner. The Indonesian Sidi Gazalba, who did considerable writing on theological subjects in the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's, attached a predominantly antisecularist character to his view of history as the sequential replacement of a

"traditional" by a "contemporary" society. The former was characterized as static, cut off from external ideas, focusing not so much on the earthly world as on the beyond. The latter was viewed as accessible to cultural influences from without, having achieved a high degree of division of labor as a result of successful scientific and technological advances. Secularization was stated as a force pernicious to further historical development, for linked with it was disruption of the vital activity of the societal organism as a result of separation of religion from culture.³⁸

Finally, some Islamic ideologists continued talking of revolution as well. But what they had in mind was not a revolutionary struggle to transform society in the interests of the toilers but rather a "palace revolution, a green revolution, as well as a revolution of growing expectations."³⁹ In particular, Mukti Ali, a prominent Indonesian liberal theorist of the end of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's, proclaimed himself a champion of the universal triumph of social justice. In actual fact, however, everything boiled down to legalizing those changes which victorious national liberation revolutions had made in the status of the bourgeoisie of oppressed nations. Demanding for this bourgeoisie more advantageous conditions of participation in the system of world capitalism, Mukti Ali expressed the apprehension that hostility toward revolutionary reforms in general, also carried over to the anticolonial struggle, would hinder the "rich nations" from manifesting interest in improving the fate of those "poor nations" which had previously been dependent on them. If the matter in question was also the continuing calamities of the people, it was only because these ideologists were disturbed by the prospect of social upheavals attended by a social protest movement. Mukti Ali and his kindred spirits appealed for philanthropy on the part of the wealthy, bringing reference to the hadith: "Poverty leads to unbelief." They saw private initiative and individual efforts as the most important stimulus of social progress.

Although the above-described views on the character and stimuli of development of society are connected with the concrete problems of Southeast Asia, expressed in these views are certain features which are characteristic of the ideological evolution of Islam in other developing countries as well.

First of all, Islamic social doctrines proper do not remain unchanged. Those who formulate them must consider the changes taking place in the world around them and in the notions of religious believers. Information on the building of socialism in the former Muslim regions of Russia exerts a particularly strong influence on the toilers. This circumstance is taken into account in particular in the formulation of various ideas of "Islamic socialism." But in all cases, without exception, assimilation of new concepts and new terminology is of a compromise, forced nature, since the initial orthodox religious principles continue to operate, principles which in the final analysis reserve for the divine will the role of universal prime mover. Many discrepancies are caused by differences in the class position and political organization of given ideologists. At the same time, developing in a common confessional channel, ideas of different types affect one another in any event. That doctrine which is formulated on the basis of a more highly-developed structure becomes the most influential.

Resistance by the exploited masses to the dictate of the exploiter upper strata receives unique reflection in the sociopolitical inhomogeneity of contemporary Muslim thought. Expansion of the framework of such a struggle, just as involvement of these masses in the movement of progressive forces, constitutes an important prerequisite for the coming liberation of the toilers from all types of enslavement, including the spiritual oppression of religion.

FOOTNOTES

1. See M. V. Malyukovskiy, "The Journal AL'-MANAR as a Source for Study of the Islamic Reformation in Egypt," "Kratkiye Soobshcheniya Instituta Vostokovedeniya" [Brief Reports of the Institute of Oriental Studies], Vol 19, Moscow, 1956; Malyukovskiy, "The Initial Stage of the Islamic Reformation in Egypt," "Uchenyye Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniya" [Scholarly Notes of the Institute of Oriental Studies], Vol 17, Moscow, 1959.
2. See S. F. Levin, "The Reformist Movement in the Indian Ismailian Trade Community of Hodja, 1829 - 1886," "Kratkiye Soobshcheniya Instituta Narodov Azii" [Brief Reports of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia], Issue 51, Moscow, 1962.
3. M. T. Stepanyants, "Islam v filosofskoy i obshchestvennoy mysli Zarubezhnogo Vostoka" [Islam in the Philosophical and Social Thought of the Non-Soviet East], Moscow, 1974, page 13.
4. See, for example, M. Weber, "The Sociology of Religion," London, 1965, page 269; R. M. Bellah, "Religion and Progress in Modern Asia," "Religion and Progress in Modern Asia," New York, 1965, page 209.
5. L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya, "Musul'manskiye techeniya obshchestvennoy mysli Indii i Pakistana (Kritika 'musul'manskogo natsionalizma')" [Islamic Currents of Social Thought in India and Pakistan (Critique of "Islamic Nationalism")], Moscow, 1963, page 5.
6. Z. I. Levin, "Razvitiye arabskoy obshchestvennoy mysli, 1917-1945" [Development of Arab Social Thought, 1917-1945], Moscow, 1979, page 144.
7. Stepanyants, op. cit., page 16.
8. Ibid., page 14.
9. For elaboration of this problem see L. Polonskaya and A. Vafa, "Typology of Non-Marxist Ideological Currents in Developing Countries," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 9, 1977.

10. See, for example, J. J. Jansen, "Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt," Leiden, 1974; L. Leone, "Reformatori musulmane del XIX secolo nell' Africa e nell' Asia Mediteranei" [19th Century Islamic Reformists in Africa and the Near East], Milan, 1973. The fact that such schematism is beginning to evoke doubts is indicated by the publication of studies containing information on the existence of so-called modernist components in traditionalists and traditionalist components in Muslim theorists of modernist trends and which draw appropriate conclusions. Studies of the first type include, for example: J. Prins, "Some Notes About Islam and Politics in Indonesia," DIE WELT DES ISLAM, Vol 4, No 1-2, 1959. Studies of the second type include, for example: A. I. Embree, "The Social Role of Religion in Contemporary India. Religious Ferment in Asia," Kansas, 1974.
11. See "Zarozhdeniye ideologii natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya (XIX-nachalo XX v)" [Origin of the Ideology of the National Liberation Movement (19th-beginning of the 20th Century)], Moscow, 1973, pp 5-13; Stepanyants, op. cit., page 16.
12. R. A. Ul'yanovskiy, "General Patterns of Socioeconomic Development and the Problem of the Specific Features of the Countries of the East," NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA, No 3, 1978, page 40.
13. A. I. Levkovskiy, "Sotsial'naya struktura razvivayushchikhsya stran" [Social Structure of Developing Countries], Moscow, 1978, page 126.
14. According to the calculations of French Islamic scholar M. Rodinson, at the beginning of the 1970's approximately one fourth of the 520 million persons professing belief in Islam were Muslims of this region (M. Rodinson, "Marxisme et monde musulmane" [Marxism and the Muslim World], Paris, 1972).
15. A. Glang, "Muslim Secession or Integration," Quezon City, 1969, page 83.
16. K. Marks and F. Engel's, "Sochineniya" [Writings], Vol 7, page 361.
17. For a discussion of the similar situation within Orthodox and non-Orthodox Christianity, see A. I. Klibanov, "Religioznoye sektantstvo v proshlom i nastoyashchem" [Religious Sectarianism in the Past and Present], Moscow, 1973, page 79.
18. Glang, op. cit., page 76.
19. Jaakub H. Abu Hassan, "Rebirth of a Monolithic Society," DUTA MASJAR MASJARAKAT (Djakarta), No 8, 1971, page 77.
20. Glang, op. cit., page 20.
21. Jaakub H. Abu Hassan, op. cit., page 20.
22. A. J. Badaruddin, and P. H. Damit, "Before the Face of Allah," THE SABAH TIMES, 7 April 1967.

23. Usman el Muhammady, "Perkembangan djiwa negara dan kebudajaan islam" [Development of the State and Islamic Culture], Djakarta, 1960, pp 308-310; S. Hussein Alatas, "Modernization and Social Change. Studies in Modernization, Religion, Social Change and Development in Southeast Asia," Sidney, 1972, pp 17, 92.
24. S. Hussein Alatas, op. cit., page 18.
25. Ibid., page 41.
26. Bahrum Rangkuti, "Existense islam" [Essence of Islam], Djakarta, 1961, pp 12, 13, 15.
27. R. M. Affandi, "Revolusi yang menempa sedjarah" [Revolution -- Engine of History], Kuala Lumpur, 1974, page 2.
28. Ibid., page 64.
29. "Revolusi mental" [Spiritual Revolution], Kuala Lumpur, 1971, pp 19, 445.
30. M. Isa Ansjar, "Fildafah perdjuangan islam" [The Philosophy of Struggle in Islam], Medan, 1951, page 128.
31. Ibid., pp 133-134.
32. M. Natsir, "Pemimpin pulang" [The Leader Returns], Djakarta, 1970, page 60.
33. M. Isa Ansjar, "Tugas dan peranan generasi muda islam dalam pembinaan orde baru" [The Task and Role of Young Muslims in Building a New Order], Bandung, 1976, page 117.
34. THE JAKARTA TIMES, 23 March 1973.
35. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, "Peranan hak azasi manusia dalam kehidupan politik dan ekonomi di Indonesia" [Role of Basic Human Rights in Indonesian Political Life and Economy], Djakarta, 1967, page 25.
36. Hamka, "Peladjaran agama islam" [Study of the Muslim Religion], Djakarta, 1967, page 205; Nawawi Jazid, "Peladjaran agama islam [Study of the Muslim Religion], Djakarta, 1965, pp 27-29.
37. Muhammad Iljas, "Bahaja atheisme terhadap sila ketuhanan" [The Danger of Atheism to the Foundation of Belief in God], Djakarta, 1966, pp 14, 123, 186-187.
38. Sidi Gazalba, "Sources of Universal Weakness and Poverty," PANDJI MASJARAKAT, (Djakarta), No 6, 1966, pp 21-22; Sidi Gazalba, "Modernisasi

dalam persoalan bagaimana sikap islam" [Modernization in Matters Dealing With Islam], Djakarta, 1973, page 61.

39. Mukti Ali, "Agama dan pembangunan di Indonesia" [Religion and the Rebirth of Indonesia], Djakarta, 1972, Vol I, page 113.

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK DEALS WITH ORIGINS, NATURE OF ISLAMIC LAW

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pp 235-236

[Review by A. I. Ionova and M. T. Stepanyants of the book "Shariat i Yego Sotsial'naya Sushchnost'" [The Shariat and its Social Essence] by G. M. Kerimov, Main Editorial Office of Eastern Literature, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, Moscow, 1978, 223 pages]

[Text] The question of the essence of the Shariat has long since ceased to be a subject of interest exclusively to Islamists. A great deal is now being written about the Shariat by representatives of Western schools of comparative jurisprudence. Responding directly to a number of legislative acts in the developing countries and the ideological-political struggle underway there, these publications contain both criticisms and practical recommendations with respect to adapting Shariat norms to the present-day reality of particular countries. Meanwhile, there have not yet been any Marxist studies dealing specially with the history of the origins and the social essence of the Shariat. The monograph under review here will fill this gap.

Drawing from the works of eminent medieval jurists, historians, and their followers writing in Arabic, Turkish, and Persian, G. M. Kerimov has set forth in detail the basic principles and tenets of the Shariat. This provides the reader with extensive and scientifically sound information concerning the question. In attempting to reveal the actual significance of Shariat institutions in the personal and social life of believers, G. M. Kerimov has undertaken to interpret the historical and social factors giving rise to particular rituals, prohibitions, and injunctions. This has enabled him to reveal the actual "mundane" motives underlying religious norms, their direct relation to changes in the life of society and the interests of the ruling classes.

After presenting a brief history of the formation of Muslim schools of law, the author focuses on the shifts that have taken place and are taking place in this "most conservative sector of Islam" (p 14): the

process of merger and interpenetration of the various legal concepts, a tendency toward the creation of some kind of unified, universal law and its modernization taking account of the developing system of civil courts. The author characterizes the mechanism of Shariat judicial practice and says that "Various contradictions in Islam law, on the one hand, and different interpretations of its tenets, on the other, have opened up broad possibilities for utilizing the law against the working people and in the interests of the exploiting classes" (p 21).

An analysis of the injunctions which affect religious ritual leads to the conclusion that carrying out relevant Shariat demands serves not only to maintain the faith but also to reconcile the exploited classes with the exploiters. The author notes that a number of Shariat injunctions run counter to common practices in modern life. As a result there are increasingly frequent and more decisive attempts by certain Muslim and state leaders of the East to get around the canonical requirements either through modernization or by less than punctilious observance of them.

A special section of the book deals with the Shariat interpretation of problems of family and marital relations. The author characterizes the forms of Islamic marriage, wedding procedures, and the conditions and methods of divorce. In this way the reader gets a complete picture of the lack of rights and the low status of Muslim women in society, of the extent of the clergy's abilities to control the personal life of the believers.

The author presents a detailed picture of the system of injunctions and restraints in spheres of trade and finance, the arts, religious rituals, and everyday life. All of this, like the examination of the Islamic concept of "purity" and "impurity," is linked directly to the Shariat's function as a regulator not only of the life processes of the Muslim community but also its relations with infidels; in the latter case the whole emphasis is on comprehensively maintaining the religious exclusivity of Muslims.

Turning to an analysis of the Shariat treatment of various aspects of criminal law, G. M. Kerimov convincingly demonstrates its original closeness to pre-Islamic practice, whose origins are linked to the process of the formation of early feudal relations among the first adherents of Islam. This is confirmed by an examination of the personal-value [lichnostno-tsennostnaya] orientation in determining the scale of punishments for crime, also by an analysis of the system of regulating family and everyday relations and methods of protecting private property.

The next section of the book deals with the Shariat's statutes in the field of property law and taxing policies: The specific norms of

inheritance, leasing and renting, the vakufs and, finally, the laws governing land use, the levying and payment of taxes, and the collection and dispensing of religious alms. The author reveals the class essence of all these institutions and shows that they are based on a division of society into the haves and the have-nots and the strivings of the former to hold the latter in subservience and forestall possible social conflicts--they are based completely on the protection and defense of private property. This serves to refute Muslim apologists who claim that Islam is capable of leading its followers on some kind of separate path of development which is distinct from capitalism or socialism. G. M. Kerimov notes, however, that the inadequate elaboration and precision of certain precepts of Islamic law make it possible to interpret it in widely varying ways. It is essential to take account of such discrepancies in order to understand the course, tendencies, and prospective development of the social movement and the ideological struggle in a number of countries of the East today.

The book's final section deals with the Shariat's role in regulating the economic activities of the believers. The author emphasizes that this role is considerable: As a result, purely secular affairs--"trade and financial transactions, hunting, fishing, livestock slaughter, and so on--are obligatorily linked by religion to the name of God" (p 198). The author presents a detailed examination of Shariat directives concerning trade regulations, including the making and breaking of trade deals.

Although the work is packed with interesting information, certain sections of the book are not uniform in regard to the depth and range of topics examined. One of the most successful is the section dealing with Islamic prohibitions with regard to the graphic arts. The author might have said a great deal more, however, about the present struggle in a number of countries of the East with regard to Muslim laws governing family and marital relations based on the principle of unequal social and civil rights of women. The structure of the book could be better. For example, the examination of the Shariat laws governing the payment of debts, bail procedures, and custody guarantee should have been left out of the section dealing with the system of legal proceedings. And it is hardly possible to term as an institution all the advokatura the plaintiff's turning over of the handling of his case--by no means a defense in the present meaning of the word--to a proxy. Nor does the author always draw a precise distinction between the Shariat and the Muslim jurisprudence--the fikkh. Finally, the book fails to reflect a remarkable fact, which is confirmed by the material the author has analyzed: As the Shariat has developed, the main emphasis of Muslim jurists has shifted from ritual and household matters to the social and economic matters.

These oversights do not diminish the author's contribution to the investigation of Shariat norms and tenets. G. M. Kerimov has successfully revealed the historical and social factors behind particular Shariat precepts. And this has made it possible to lay the scientific groundwork for a difficult and at the same time essential effort: reconciling legal theory with practice. The work will be of considerable value in scientific-atheistic work and will attract the attention of a broad range of readers.

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CHRONOLOGY OF ISLAM PRESENTED

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[Article by L. Vasil'yev, doctor of historical sciences: "ISLAM:
Directions, Trends, Sects, Orthodox Islam, the Sunnites"]

[Text] Islam was formed at the turn of the sixth and seventh centuries on the periphery of the Judaeo-Christian world, on the border of the European (with its Graeco-Roman ancient heritage) and Near Eastern civilizations and was a result of a complex process of religious and cultural synthesis. The Old Testament legends of the Bible and the impressive revelations of the Christian Gospel, Greek philosophy and Roman law, Zoroastrism and Buddhism, the traditions of despotic tyranny and the norms of the centralized bureaucratic administration of ancient empires--all this and much else, including the pre-Islamic beliefs and the principles of existence of the Arabs themselves, played their role in the formation of the ideological and institutional structure of Islamic civilization.

The founder of Islam and its prophet, Mohammed, borrowed widely for his teaching from various ideas, concepts, legends, mythological subjects and even names. However, the historical service of Mohammed was that he was able, on that basis, to formulate an internally integrated and a fairly logical harmonious religious doctrine that was needed so much by his tribesmen, who, under the green banner of Islam were able to be transformed from a relatively small and backward group of Semitic tribes in a negligible historical period into a large and highly developed civilization. It must also not be forgotten that the brilliant culture of the Near Eastern middle ages was not so much an Arabic as an Arabic-language culture, developed by the efforts of numerous ancient peoples of that region who were islamized and assimilated by the Arabs.

Islam is a religious doctrine, philosophical and legal thought, an ethno-cultural tradition, and the customary form of life of hundreds of millions of "true-believers" was a closed but rather freely self-regulating system. In the course of the centuries of its evolution, that system was subjected

to certain erosion: life has generated serious problems, in the searches for an answer to which the original doctrine has become overgrown with voluminous interpretations and has generated new formulas which, in turn, have inevitably led to the appearance of numerous offshoots, factions and sects down to congregations and orders with an esoteric structure, absolute discipline and unquestioned authority of the leader intrinsic to them.

Of course, the natural feeling of self-preservation dictated the need to develop the means to prevent or even hold back the inevitable process of destruction. In part those elements were already built into the original structure of Islam. Thus, an integral fusion of the spiritual and secular principles, with priority of religious power even in the absence of an autonomous ecclesiastical organization, contributed to making the authority of Islam absolute. This prevented detriment to the system on the part of the political: any political statements, no matter who expressed them, were regulated within the framework of the system and in practice simply could not go beyond its limits. The situation was just about the same with social cataclysms: economic ethics with the zakat (a tax on property owners) and other forms of alms has directed the energy of the discontented into the channel of reforms within the framework of Islam. In addition, the absence of class distinctions and the primacy of the spiritual authority have created high social mobility in Islamic society and, as it was in the China of Confucius, gave those who succeeded in the study and interpretation of doctrine a favorable opportunity to rise. Finally, a powerful ideological filter, after passing through which any ideological or institutional innovation in practice does not threaten the integrity and stability of the system, and which is intrinsic to such systems (Islam and Confucianism), should be classed among the elements preventing the process of destruction.

Even a brief analysis is of the elements contributing to strengthening of the system permits one to understand and estimate the force and stability of Islam both in the historic past and in the modern world. In other words, Islam belongs among the most powerful and stable of religious and ideological systems. The political, mosaic character of the structure of the Islamic world, which is especially evident in our day, does not at all weaken that system as such, but rather makes it more stable in a certain sense, than others, the fates of which (as of Confucianism) were closely connected with a great, but single political empire, the downfall of which meant the downfall of the system.

The religious doctrine of Islam was formed and improved over the course of centuries. At first Mohammed was its source. After the death of the prophet he was replaced by the text of the Koran, supplemented later by the six volumes of the Sadih of the Sunna [path] (oral legends and sermons with reference to the authority of the prophet) and the approved practice of the shari'a (a codex of religious and legal norms) with its four

schools of law (Hanifism, Shafiism, Malikism and Hanbalism). Moslems who completely and unreservedly accepted all those sources and the standards of behavior sanctioned by them were the supporters of orthodox Islam (in the ninth century they began to be called Sunnites, that is, those who completely acknowledge the authority of the Sunna). They were opposed (as they are opposed even now) by the Shiites--supporters of the opposite direction in Islam, who created the cult of the cousin and son-in-law of Mohammed, the fourth and last of the first four elected caliphs, Ali.

Although within the framework of orthodox Sunnism (as also of the opposition Shiism) there is internal doctrinal integrity, it in turn has many tendencies, offshoots and sects, the formation of which has accompanied the entire history of Islam and has been closely connected with it. The first of those offshoots was the Kharijites.

The Kharijites and Their Sects

When Ali, who had long striven to become the head of the faithful, finally arrived in power in the year 656 after his supporters had killed the caliph Osman, only a few acknowledged him. Those supporters, dissatisfied with the leadership of the prophet's widow, Ayshiya, and the vice-regent of Syria, the Mu'awiyah, rose against him and at the decisive moment in the battle when their defeat was already predetermined, proposed halting the battle and having the dispute settled by a court of arbitration, which corresponded to the principles of Islam. Ali accepted that proposal and that proved to be a fatal error. The troops, disturbed by his indecisiveness, left their ranks in protest and began to be called the Kharijites (those who have left).

The Kharijites, who at times are called the Puritans of Islam, spoke out for preservation of the original purity of doctrine, for the promotion to the high post of caliph, "deputy of the prophet," of only the most worthy Moslems, the most zealous, sincere and noteworthy adherents of the faith, regardless of their origin, down to recently converted slaves from among the foreigners. They considered only the first two, Abu Bakr and Omar, to be such worthy men, assuming that the none too bright Osman was properly removed from power. Ali was considered worthy and deserving of support, but, in agreeing to a sly subterfuge with a court of arbitration, he displayed weakness and inconsistency in the defense of the faith and therefore had to go. In his place the Kharijites elected their own caliph, Ibn Wakhbu, under whose banner they opposed Ali. In a decisive battle in 658 the forces of Ali defeated the Kharijites and killed their caliph. However, Ali was soon felled also, by a Kharijite dagger, and Mu'awiyah arrived at power, founding the Omayyad dynasty.

At first the Kharijites tried to resist the Omayyads, staging one uprising after another in different regions of the caliphate, and their supporters grew larger and larger in numbers. However the uprisings were

suppressed ruthlessly, and soon there was dissidence even in the midst of the Kharijites themselves. The supporters of Ibn Ibad held a more moderate position and reached a compromise with the authorities, founding the sect of the Ibadites (Abadites). In the middle of the 8th century, however, the Ibadites again staged an armed uprising in Arabia and, being forced to retreat, settled in the region of Oman, which since then has been a stronghold of Moslems of that sect. The Omani Ibadites were ruled, in accordance with their teaching, by elected imams, and the attempts of some of them to establish a hereditary sultanate aroused resistance and were defeated. In the same eighth century some of the Ibadites settled in North Africa, where their ideas were supported by the Arabs and Berbers of Magrib. Even now the supporters of the Kharijites-Ibadites constitute an influential religious minority in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.

To counterbalance the moderate course of the Ibadites, the supporters of Al'Azrak united into the sect of Azrakites, who were summoned to an uncompromising struggle with the Omayyads under the slogan of the "jihad" ("the holy war"). Having gained a number of victories over the forces of the caliph at the end of the seventh century, the Azrakites then suffered a crushing defeat and soon left the scene. The intolerance of the Azrakites, who saw a mortal enemy in anyone who differed from the Kharijite views, created a unique vacuum around them that also led to their disappearance; within the framework of Islam such extreme positions were too dangerous and destructive and therefore the system's forces of self-preservation did not give such a sect the possibility of surviving and becoming stronger.

Still another Kharijite sect, the Sufrites (or Sofrites), formed at the end of the same seventh century. Occupying more moderate positions than the Azrakites, the Sufrites considered it possible to resort to tactics of maneuvering, temporary deviation from the idea of the jihad, and even concealment of their beliefs. However, this could not help them to be preserved as an independent sect: with time the Sufrites were practically absorbed by the Ibadites, together with whom they were active in Magrib.

The Kharijites played a large role in the development of the positions of Islam. The ideologists of Islam introduced into Islamic theology (the Kalam) the important postulate of the correlation of faith and works: faith not reinforced by pious works is ineffective. The Kharijites were very strict in matters of the cult and faith and spoke in favor of purification not only of the body (before prayer) but also of the spirit, for purity of conscience and mercilessness toward sinners, condemned any sort of luxury and spoke sharply against diversions such as music, games or wine. Their goal was the creation of states of high justice, which reflected the utopian ideals of the very poor peasantry predominate in their ranks.

Among the theological problems that the first Moslem theologians, the kalamists, encountered was the question of predetermination and free will.

The information on it in the Koran was contradictory: at times the idea of fatalistic inevitability persists (without the will of Allah, a hair does not fall), and at times, on the contrary, the fate of man proves to depend directly on his behavior and passions. The accent on fatalism was advantageous to the Omayyad caliphs, sanctioning their right to power. The Kharijites naturally could not agree with that, and they were impelled to lay stress on the opposite. It was precisely at this point that the course of early Islamic thought came into contact with another, no less known and significant course in the channel of orthodox Mohammedanism--the teaching of freedom of the will.

The Kadarites and Mu'tazilites

The first to oppose the dogma of fatalistic predetermination were the Kadarites ("kadar" is fate and predestination; the kadarites favored limitation of kadar in the opposite sense of the word). The Kadarites said that man is the creator of his own fate, that he is responsible for his actions himself and that his salvation or damnation depends therefore on himself alone. The influence of Christian ideas is felt in such a formulation--it was no accident that among the Kadarites an eminent place was occupied by theologians from Syria, where Christianity still recently flourished.

That onslaught was headed and conducted by the Mu'tazilites (the separatists), by whose efforts the foundations of Islamic theology were laid. The successors of Ibn Ata (699-748), the theoreticians of Ma'tazilism under the Omayyads, sharply criticized the dogma of fatal predesigination. On the basis of the rational Greek philosophers (especially Aristotle and Plato), whose works had already been translated into Arabic, using the logic and dialectics developed by the Greeks, as a tool of cognition, the Mu'tazilites proclaimed reason to be a criterion of faith. Placing the trustworthiness of many postulates under doubt, the Mu'tazilites asserted that man is free in his actions, that it is precisely his free will that is the source of good and evil, whereas reason serves as the highest criterion of good, evil and justice. A thing is good, not because Allah has allowed it--Allah has allowed a thing because it is good. Allah is wise and just, and so he also creates what is rational and advisable, having the good of man in mind. People pursue good or evil, for which Allah rewards or punishes them. Allowed injustice is corrected by the universal law of retribution: for undeserved suffering in this world man will be rewarded, and in that is manifested the highest rational, even divine, justice. In a word, Allah is limited in his actions by definite circumstances and is free in them in a certain sense even less than man.

To counterbalance the objections that were raised, the Mu'tazilites opposed anthropomorphism, considering Allah to be a spiritual abstraction and proposing that the references in the Koran to his foot or hand (that is, his corporeal substance) be considered allegories. This also

applied to such attributes of Allah as the word. In early Islam the word of Allah, that is, the Koran, was considered ageless and uncreated; Mohammad only heard and transcribed the word that Mohammed heard, so that the Koran should not be considered uncreated. The Mu'tazilites had a clear tendency to bring to earth the divine principle in Islam, which was manifested, in particular, in a not very deferential attitude toward the prophet who, in their opinion, had too many wives.

The Abbasids, who had come to power by means of the combined efforts of the opposition (the Shiites, Khawarij and Mu'tazilites), soon not only accepted the doctrine of the Mu'tazilites but also converted it into the dominant one. In the three Mu'tazilite caliphates, starting with Mamun (813-833) the cult of reason and respect for philosophy and sciences, including the ancient heritage, played an eminent role, and the Mu'tazilites themselves were transformed into priests of their truth whose intolerance toward those of a different trend of thought increased more and more. This was followed by strict persecutions not only of fanatic opponents but in general of all who disagreed or doubted. Starting from liberalism, the Mu'tazilites arrived at the inquisition, which also was the undoing of that trend of thought. The decline of Mu'tazilism was connected with the activity of the well-known theologian Al'Ashari (873-935).

Ashari, who at first adhered to the teaching of the Mu'tazilites, revised his views and began to insist on the idea of the uncreated character and eternal age of the Koran (legend asserts that the sudden change in his views was caused by a prophetic dream in which the prophet himself led Ashari to proceed in just that way). And although the positions of Ashari on a number of issues, including predetermination, were inconsistent, his theological ideas, which took a great deal from both the Mu'tazilites and their opponents, lay at the basis of orthodox Sunnitic kalam, which had overcome the extreme positions of its predecessors. Since that time the name of Sunnism has been ratified as orthodox Islam.

But the kalam of the Asharistic interpretation became the dominant trend of Moslem theological thought only when the renowned Al'Ghazali (1058-1111), one of the outstanding intellects of Islam, came out in favor of it. His activity was essential also in that he regulated the relations between that official trend and what had become by that time its most notable rival, Sufism.

Sufism

Whereas some followers of Islam have preferred reason as the basis in their searches for the truth, others have chosen intuition. The Sufi are the mystics of Islam, ascetics and hermits who have striven to merge with Allah, to be dissolved in him, to get to know his divine truth at the price of the complete denial of everything else. The Sufi (a "suf" is a

coarse woolen cloak they used to wear) are unusual Moslem monks, mendicant dervishes. Their appearance was a reaction of zealous champions of the purity of the Islamic idea to its profanation on the part of the power of the wealthy, above all the caliphs and their retainers, who already by the end of the seventh century had departed far from the standards bequeathed by the prophet. True, the prophet himself did not call for asceticism and monasticism but treated ascetics with respect, considering continence almost a high virtue.

The first religious communes of the Sufi appeared in Iraq (Kufi, Basra and Baghdad) and Syria as early as at the start of the seventh century, after which they spread rapidly over a wide territory from Spain to India, and then into Indonesia. The unusual type and strange behavior of the Sufi at first caused a watchful and alienated attitude of true-believers, suspicions and, at times, persecution by the authorities, and there were many grounds for that. The fact is that the Sufi, having devoted themselves completely to Allah, were liberated, as it were, of most of the ceremonies, conventions and responsibilities that were the norm of life of true-believers. Thus, in place of the worship of God five times a day the Sufi performed a specific ceremony of devotion--dhikr, the forms of which varied from an ecstatic trance to deep internal concentration, similar to Buddhist meditation. With time, however, the Sufi not only became ordinary but also earned, for their dedication to the faith and sacrifices in the name of Allah, great respect among Moslems who saw, through contact with a dervish and in giving him alms and merit, a true means of sharing in his holiness and getting closer to Allah.

The first Sufi leaders--Al'Basri, Al'Mukhazibi and Al'Hallaj--taught their followers to seek God in themselves, to develop in themselves a love of God, only of him, of him alone, and to do that with simultaneous quests for internal perfection, with deep purification of the spirit and intentions, with total subordination of the personal and social to Allah in order to gradually transform oneself into an instrument of Allah. Intuitive cognition, the accustoming of oneself to and in the final account merging with Allah led to a transformation of the entire path traveled by the Sufi and their unique saint, who has as it were the possibility of contact with Allah apart from feeling and reason.

In accordance with that doctrine, the early authorities of Sufism worked out a "ladder" of several graduated stages, the last of which is conclusive and symbolizes accustoming oneself to the murid (literally, the "seeker," that is, the student) for the higher secrets of Sufism. That path along the stages of perfection in Sufism obtains the name "tarikah" ("tarika" means "path"), being realized within the framework of the Sufi monastery schools, which at first were the basic organizational form of the movement, the residences of most of the Sufi. In general Sufism is an aggregate of very different schools, each of which is oriented toward the teaching of its own founder, whose authority is absolute. They treat

orthodox Islam differently: the more moderate accept almost all its dogmas, whereas the more extreme do not acknowledge, as has been mentioned, any norms and at times deliberately flabbergast the true-believers.

Along with division into moderate and extremist, in the 11th century Sufiism also began to be rather clearly differentiated in its intellectual character. The intellectuals of Islam were more and more distinguished among the Sufi. Usually they were educated ulema and matakalis who, being unsatisfied with the cheerless morality of the orthodox kalam, began to seek the deep meaning of existence and share in the mystical and metaphysical. Drawing close to the doctrine and dogma of Sufiism, becoming immersed in the atmosphere of the seekers of God, merging with Allah and celebrating the advantages of personal mystical contact with the divinity, those Islamic intellectuals usually came into contact with moderate Sufiism, and also merged with it in practice, in turn drawing close to the Sunnite kalam. It was precisely that path that was taken by Ghazali, whose enormous influence played a very important role in drawing moderate Sufiism close to the kalam and in the official acknowledgement of the Sufi by the orthodox of the caliphate. However, the moderate and all the more so intellectual Sufiism--in spite of all its considerable effect on Arabian-Islamic culture (it suffices to recall Sufi poetry)--it is only a part of Sufiism. Another and, in a certain sense, greater part has always been and remains to this day religious, practical Sufiism mainly of the very rigid, extreme interpretation, at times with very radical directions.

Sufi Orders, Muridism

Starting about the 11th century, Sufi (dervish) orders began to arise in various regions of the caliphate based on schools of the monastery type. To replace organizational forms very indeterminate in character, within the framework of which the early Sufi joined together and sought divine truth, came an austere and harmonious structure of hierarchic congregations headed by honorable senior Sufi who already had not only absolute religious authority but also indisputable administrative power over the murids subordinate to them, the number of which at times increased to tens and hundreds of thousands. Those murids, however, were not the Sufi who independently sought God in themselves and strove to merge with Allah. Of course, many of them, as before, were dervishes who acted alone, traveling in the Islamic countries and propagating their ideas, demonstrating their "sanctity" and, at times, even founding branches of their orders. With time, however, a larger and larger number of murids became common soldiers of the order, devoted to its leaders, who more often resembled feudal theocratic rulers in social status, political and administrative power and in form of life and income.

In the course of the 11th through 14th centuries, the number of such congregational orders rose especially rapidly, although new organizations of that sort also arose later, to say nothing of new branches of existing

orders. The chargers of the orders, the structures and internal rites and rituals of which were different, as were the views and teachings of the patriarchs, were the founders of those congregations. Some of them could, on occasion, be converted into powerful military detachments around which important national movements formed, as was the case of the movement of Shaml in the Caucasus in the middle of the 19th century. Others were propagated in a completely peaceful way, moving to new places and attracting supporters among the local population, which is especially characteristic of Africa, where the Sufi orders until recently were powerful autonomous corporations, unique states within a state. Among Sufi orders in Africa, very great influence is enjoyed by the Qadiriyyah (the followers of Al'Qadir, who founded that order in the 12th century), although Rifaiyyah, Shadiliyyah, Tijaniyyah, Senusiyyah, Hamaliyyah, Muradiyyah, Rashidiyyah and a number of others, some of whom, such as Senusiyyah, in individual cases also seized power in the country (in Libya until recently the king was the head of that order). The same orders were active in Asia (among them Qadiriyyah had the greatest weight) and others--Khalwatiyyah, Nakshbendiyyah, Sukhradwerdiyyah and Saadiyyah.

The sheiks and imams of the brotherhoods and the orders under consideration were respected as bearers of divine grade--baraka, which was "transmitted" from one leader to another, his successor. The greatest amount of such grace was at the disposal, naturally, of the patriarch-founder, famous heroes and martyrs for the faith. After death, they all usually were canonized as saints, their names and actions became overgrown with legends and the places of their burial were transformed into centers of pilgrimage and were considered to have miraculous power, becoming at times objects of the frenzied worship of the faithful. This naturally has not pleased everyone.

The Wahhabi

In the 18th century, Ali Wahhabi, striving to return purity to Islam and rid it of false saints, headed the movement of the Wahhabi, whose severe asceticism excluded any cult (including that of the prophet) and opposed both entertainment and spiritual intermediaries in the mutual relations of a Moslem with Allah. Acting under the slogan of the jihad and having sacked a number of Arabian cities, including Mecca (where even the Kaaba stone, sacred to all Moslems, was stolen), the Wahhabi founded their emirate there at the start of the 9th century--the Sauds rule in Saudi Arabia even now. Of course, Wahhabism, which is the state sect of Saudi Arabia, has become more moderate, and many saints of Arabia have not only been restored but also flourishing, as are numerous confessors of various sorts and categories.

The influence of the Wahhabi also spread to India. True, Islam in India deserves special examination, for it is too closely connected with Hinduism. However, that did not prevent a more or less considerable number of sects from forming in India in the depths of orthodox Islam. The reference is to the Ahmadiyyah sect.

Ahmadiyah Sect

Its founder, Ahmad Qadiani from Punjab in 1889 declared himself the mehdī--the Messiah, an embodiment of Mohammed, Jesus and Krishna, and strove, as was characteristic of many religious reformers in India, to reconcile, to bring closer the various religious doctrines. In spite of those efforts, the teaching of Ahmadiyah soon was transformed mainly into an Islamic sect and as such became widespread both in states adjacent to India, Afghanistan and Iran and in other states of Asia and especially of Africa. Preachers and missionaries of this sect are often migrants from India, actively creating their centers and attracting supporters from the local population.

The Reformation and Modernization of Islam

Among the trends in orthodox Sunnism in the 19th and 20th centuries are those resulting from the need to reform Islam, the need to somehow combine its dogma with the rapidly changing present day, with the tasks in resisting the colonizers, the tasks of the independent national development of the African and Asian countries. In the 19th century, the most characteristic of those movements was Pan-Islamism, headed by the Progressive reformers Al'Afghan and M. Abdo, and which then degenerated into the reactionary movement of the caliphatists. Characteristic of the 20th century and especially of the postwar rapid development are two main movements--Islamic nationalism and Islamic socialism, often interwoven with one another in different degrees. Those two tendencies are rather strong even today. Whereas the slogans of Islamic socialism are only a euphemism that at times covers the development of a country along the path of capitalism, Islamic nationalism speaks rather definitely about itself: its active supporters and the leaders of Pakistan and some Arab countries strive precisely for a nationalist revival under the traditional, in the best case somewhat modified, slogans of orthodox Islam.

In conclusion it should be recalled that orthodox Islam, having survived the crisis of modernization (its highest manifestation was the Kemalists reforms in Turkey in the 1920's and 1930's), then recovered from it, reorganized somewhat, adapted and now demonstrates not only vitality but also very impressive activity in various spheres of social life.

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SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN'S NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

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[Article by Yu. V. Gankovskiy: "Social Structure of the Population of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan"]

[Text] Study of the social structure of society in developing countries is attracting increasing attention on the part of Soviet and foreign investigators. Analysis of the social structure of the population and those changes which are taking place in it is essential in order objectively to assess the thrust and results of the socioeconomic, political and cultural development of a given country (or region) and to elucidate its specific features and significance of the various factors influencing it.

This brief paper contains an analysis of the social structure of the population of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

According to the figures in reference and other literature, the total area of the NWFP, including the so-called "tribal strip," is approximately 101,700 square kilometers (estimate). It is divided (1974) into four regions: Peshawar (administrative districts -- Peshawar, Mardan and Kohat); Malakand (districts -- Chitral, Dir and Swat); Dera Ismail Khan (districts -- Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu); Hazara (districts -- Abbottabad, Mansehra, and Kohistan). The "Tribal Strip" is subdivided administratively into seven agencies: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzay, Kurram, Northern Waziristan, and Southern Waziristan. According to the figures of the 1972 census, the population of this territory was approximately 10,909,000 (2,689,000 of whom resided in the "tribal strip"). The average population density is 107 persons per square kilometer. The Peshawar and Mardan districts are the most densely populated (428 and 388 persons per square kilometer respectively). Chitral contains the lowest population density -- 15 persons per square kilometer. In an ethnic breakdown the population of the NWFP consists of Pushtuni (8,095,000, 2,654,000 of whom live in the "tribal strip"), Punjabi (2,383,000), Urdu-speaking settlers from Northern and Western India and their descendants (154,000), and members of small ethnic groups speaking the Dard languages (Chitrali, Kohistani, Shin and others, a total of 138,000 persons).¹

The aftereffects of 100 years of colonialist rule have not yet been eliminated in the NWFP, which negatively affects the character of this region's economy and the social structure of the local society and its gainfully employed population. In spite of the fact that capitalism has become the principal system in the most highly developed districts (Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat), on the whole diversity and multiplicity of structure are characteristic of the socioeconomic system of this province (as a consequence of nonuniformity of development of bourgeois relations).²

A strong barter system is retained in the economy (especially in the "tribal strip"); precapitalist methods and forms of toiler exploitation have not been eliminated; the tenacity of backward production relations and the strong influence of the lowest forms of capital are inhibiting the growth of labor productivity and level of accumulation. A graphic picture of the economic backwardness of the NWFP is presented by official figures on per capita annual income: in 1969 it was only 360 rupees,³ or 75 U.S. dollars, with the bulk of this income generated in the subsistence, small-scale commodity producing and small-scale capitalist sectors of the economy. Nor did per capita annual income increase appreciably in the 1970's.

Two thirds of the gainfully employed population (exceeding 3.2 million persons in the NWFP and the "tribal strip") are employed in agriculture, which generates approximately 40% of the region's GNP. According to figures for 1975, only 552,000 persons were employed in industrial production (in which cottage industry still plays an important role) and construction, or 17% of the gainfully employed population, while their share of the region's GNP did not exceed 18%.⁴

There are only two cities in the NWFP with a population in excess of 100,000 -- Peshawar (273,000 according to the 1972 census) and Mardan (109,000). Approximately 780,000 persons were residing in 33 urban-type communities (or 7.6% of the population of the NWFP and "tribal strip").⁵ Actually all large cities and towns are located in administrative districts (the only urban-type communities in the "tribal strip" are Landi Kotal in the Khyber Agency and Parachinar in Kurram).

The most numerous toiler detachment in this province is the peasantry. A portion (approximately 16.4% of all persons employed in agriculture) are landless farm laborers. They are most numerous in the Mardan district, where they comprise 55%, that is, more than half of the economically active rural population, while in other districts they do not exceed 5% of the rural population. Predominant among independent farmers are owners of landholdings up to one hectare in size (approximately 330,000 persons); 48% of all farms involve as a rule subsistence or semisubsistence farming. More than half of all these farmers (28.4% of all households) own tiny plots of less than 0.4 hectare and are for all practical purposes farm laborers who happen to own a plot of land.

The next largest rural population groups are the leaseholders (approximately 215,000 persons; 31.5% of all households) and persons farming their

own plots and at the same time leased land (approximately 140,000 persons; 20.5% of all households). The average size of leaseholder plots is 1.7 hectares per household, with 3.3 hectares per household of "owner-lessees."

The rural elite (owners of from 10 to 20 hectares) total approximately 25,000 persons (3.5% of all households); they hold not less than one sixth of all cultivated land, that is, twice as much as all owners of plots of 1 hectare and smaller. Wealthy villagers control the bulk of farm credit (in the 1960's more than 70% of the peasants of the Peshawar region and more than 50% of peasants in the Der Ismail Khan region were burdened by debt⁶) and village commerce.

As a result of agrarian reforms carried out in the NWFP after 1947, property differentiation within the local peasantry was intensified, and processes of formation of classes and social strata characteristic of the bourgeois society were accelerated. During the 1950's the number of landless farm laborers almost quadrupled; during that same time the number of landowners declined by 25%. Bankrupt peasants swelled the ranks of hired farm laborers and migrants to the country's major cities. Large semi-proletarian and urban lumpen strata formed from their ranks. At the same time there was a decline in the number of lessees without rights (or, as they are called, "lessees by charity," who prior to the reforms possessed no rights to the plots they farmed), since now they had been given certain guarantees against being driven off the land. Almost all hereditary leaseholders who had been making cash lease payments (particularly numerous in the Hazara region) made full purchase of their plots of land. The peasant campaign to limit land ownership by landed proprietors and to reduce taxes and land rent payments became intensified after 1971. Peasant actions frequently assumed the form of armed rebellion.⁷

The next largest toiler group in the NWFP, after the peasants, are the so-called independent workers in nonagricultural sectors of the economy -- they total more than 700,000 in this province. They are highly heterogeneous in a social respect. More than half are employed in cottage crafts (manufacture of fabrics, footwear, crockery, weapons, etc); at least 250,000 are in retail trade, while the remainder are in other areas of the service industry. A large percentage of these independent workers are involved in precapitalist economic forms, and only the upper stratum has been transformed (or is in the process of transformation) into petit bourgeois.

Formation of an industrial proletariat in the NWFP began only a few decades ago. In 1947 there were 27 enterprises of qualifying industry (that is, enterprises employing more than 20 hired workers), with a total work force of 1,500. By 1968 the number of such enterprises had risen to 174 (27,400 workers); by 1975 the number of enterprises of qualifying industry had increased to 302 (45,400 workers).⁸ The majority of the qualifying enterprises and correspondingly the majority of industrial workers in the province were in Peshawar district.⁹ Several large

enterprises (sugar mills and tobacco factories) have been built in Mardan district. The largest detachment of the Pushtuni worker class are the textile workers (approximately 40% of all proletarians); these are followed by food and gustatory industry workers (30%).

In addition to qualifying enterprises, there were approximately 3,000 small industrial establishments in the NWFP (each employing less than 20 workers), representing a total labor force of approximately 30,000 hired workers; 80% of these enterprises were established in the 1960's. Two thirds of the non-qualifying enterprises were located on the territory of administrative districts.¹⁰

Worker class living standards (especially unskilled workers) remain low, which is connected in particular with a steady rise in the cost of living. A high rate of labor turnover is observed. Labor turnover as well as retained persisting ties with the village for a considerable percentage of the Pushtuni proletariat are slowing the formation of permanent proletarian cadres and impeding organizational and political unification of the worker class.

Formation of an intelligentsia in the NWFP began in the first decades of the 20th century; at the present time it consists primarily of persons from affluent strata of society: well-to-do peasants, merchants and artisans, landowners, the bourgeoisie, and members of the clergy. The intelligentsia totals approximately 100,000. The largest segment comprises low-level public servants and employees of private firms (almost 60,000 persons). They are followed by teachers at elementary and secondary schools and higher educational institutions (approximately 15,000), medical personnel, and persons of the so-called free professions. The intelligentsia elite, who are comparatively well paid in terms of conditions in the NWFP (engineers, lawyers, doctors, college and university professors) consists chiefly of people who have received a university education outside the province -- in Karachi, Lahore, as well as abroad, in the United States and England.

In the colonial era the local intelligentsia formed almost exclusively from persons from the administrative districts (for example, in 1951 there were only 8 persons in the Malakand Agency with a higher education and 47 persons with completed secondary education).¹¹ Today a stratum of intelligentsia has also developed in the "tribal strip," although numerically still small, to be true.¹² In the mid-1970's there were approximately 60,000 young people attending college or in the higher grades of secondary schools (31,500 in 1961).

An important role in societal affairs in the NWFP is played by the ulama -- Muslim theologians. They total more than 15,000. The majority of the ulama (approximately 80%) are ministers attached to mosques (imams and mullahs); the next largest group comprises teachers (mudaris) in secular and Muslim religious schools (maktab, madrasa and darul-ulum). The

numbers and influence of the ulama are particularly great in the districts of Mardan, Peshawar, Bannu, Swat, and in the Hazara region. They are also quite influential, however, in the other districts as well, as well as in the "tribal strip" (where approximately 10% of all ulama in the province reside), due to persistence of the religious forms of social consciousness. In the colonial era many ulama, closely linked with the Pushtuni peasantry, artisans and merchants, sharing their social and political ideals, frequently became organizers and inspirers of anti-British activities, due to which they acquired great authority and prestige among the anti-imperialist segments of society, prestige which they still retain today.

The elite group within the ulama (close in material status to the Pushtuni bourgeoisie and landowners) plays an appreciable role in political affairs of the NWFP. Close to this group in status and influence are the heads of religious Islamic orders (pir and ishan), many of whom have thousands of murids.

The exploiter elite of the Pushtuni (and of the other peoples populating this province) is numerically small and extremely heterogeneous in a social respect, which is due to the historical peculiarities of its formation.

Development of elements of capitalism on the territory of the NWFP began at the end of the 19th century. Seeking to transform the local landlords into a dependable social supporting element, the British colonialists helped them expropriate communal and peasant lands, handed out extensive jagirs¹³ to the maliks and khans, and awarded them honorary titles. As a result of this policy, by the 1930's the landed gentry of the administrative districts of the NWFP had seized more than 60% of all cultivated land. As a result almost half of the rural populace was transformed into lessees, and there occurred stepped-up migration of impoverished peasants to the cities. Specialization of artisan production began to be evident.

Alongside formation of private gentry land ownership and stratification of the peasantry, a Pushtuni national merchant class began to form. With the increasing development of commodity-money relations, it took over an increasingly large portion of the domestic goods exchange which was developing between the mountain and plains areas of the province, between the growing cities and towns and the surrounding agricultural areas. In the most highly developed areas, gravitating to such a large urban center as Peshawar, conditions arose for transferring a portion of the assets amassed by the Pushtuni (and other local) landlords and merchants into the area of industrial production. The forming of a Pushtuni national bourgeoisie accelerated in the period between the two world wars. But in the mountain valleys of the "tribal strip" capitalism was still in its initial stages right up to the end of the colonial era: precapitalist relations predominated, frequently burdened by vestiges of the clan-tribal way of life.¹⁴

The lack of development of capitalist relations in the territories of this province led to a situation where formation of a Pushtuni bourgeoisie was also taking place beyond the boundaries of these territories: there was a continuing emigration of Pushtuni to the Punjab and Sind, where Pushtuni merchants found more favorable opportunities for placement and growth of their capital. Many Pushtuni who relocated to the Punjab and Sind became wandering merchants, combining this occupation with usury. Returning to their homeland, they would purchase land or shares in some company, or would establish their own enterprises.

Development of capitalism in the Pushtuni lands accelerated appreciably after 1947. Since the local bourgeoisie formed primarily from affluent landholders (tribal khans and maliks, retired military officers and civil servants, that is, for all practical purposes originating from those same landlord circles),¹⁵ the Pushtuni bourgeois retained and still retain, frequently in the form of a "personal union," ties with the social milieu which had engendered them. Many Pushtuni entrepreneurs are at the same time a landlord, factory owner, and merchant.¹⁶

As of the beginning of the 1960's 8% of all privately-owned Muslim firms in Pakistan belonged to Pushtuni businessmen (according to the figures of American scholar G. Papanek) (for comparison: 3.5% belonged to Bengali Muslims and 5% to Hodja-Ismailiyans).¹⁷ A high percentage of these businessmen were Yusufzaya by tribal affiliation -- landlords and merchants who had become rich in transit trade with Afghanistan: traders in textiles became owners of textile mills, while landowners who had engaged in growing sugar cane became sugar mill owners. Many wealthy Pushtuni businessmen became owners of and shareholders in industrial enterprises, transportation and trading companies not only in the NWFP but also in the Punjab and Sind.

Development of capitalist relations after 1947, which was accompanied by centralization of capital and concentration of production, promoted the formation of several groups or associations of the large Pushtuni trade-industrial bourgeoisie¹⁸ (Gandhara Industries; Khyber Agencies; Karimi Industries; etc), which had millions of rupees at their disposal and which directly or indirectly controlled the activities of several dozen firms in the textile, tobacco, sugar, metalworking and other branches of industry, as well as in the area of trade and exchange. Among the owners and managers of these companies, Pushtuni by origin, are many prominent statesmen and politicians, high-ranking military officers, and scions of distinguished aristocratic families. Members of the Pushtuni upper crust are usually linked by many years of personal ties and common interests (joint participation in running big industrial and trading companies) with many business magnates from the Punjab and Sind. Of course these ties have not and do not mean that there is no competitive rivalry among the different big-business trading and industrial establishments.

As noted above, the exploiter upper stratum in the Pushtuni society is numerically small. The majority are large landholders (approximately 12,000 persons), who even today own almost 60% of all (farmed and uncultivated) land in Pushtuni-populated areas. The following group is the Pushtuni bourgeoisie, totaling approximately 4,000 merchants and entrepreneurs (in the last 30 years the size of this stratum had grown almost sixfold). Adjacent to them in social status is the civil servant bureaucracy elite, approximately 1,000 persons.

In the decades which have passed since 1947 a considerable portion of the wealthy upper stratum of Pushtuni has virtually merged with the wealthy elite Punjabi, Muhajir (migrants from India and their descendants) and other ethnic communities of present-day Pakistan into a unified Pakistani elite. Many top Pakistani Government officials are Pushtuni by nationality. Pushtunis comprise 20% of the officer corps of Pakistan's armed forces, 16% of police officers, and 11% of upper-echelon Pakistan Government officials. Many of them have become owners of estates on irrigated land in Southwestern Punjab and Northern Sind. Today the principal sources of their high incomes and elevated social status (just as many wealthy Pushtuni businessmen) lie outside the boundaries of the NWFP.

An important feature of the NWFP, rooted in the colonial past, is the fact that the principal source of income for a significant part of the able-bodied male population of this province (including the "tribal strip") (and frequently the sole source) is service in the army, police, border troops, various provincial, paramilitary units, as well as in the civil administrative edifice. Under conditions of a growing agrarian overpopulation and chronic unemployment, the pay received for this service, as well as pension benefits, very often form the basis of livelihood for parents, brothers, sisters and children of Pushtuni who have donned the military and police uniform. At the beginning of the 1970's more than 80,000 Pushtuni were serving in the army alone, most of whom were from the Peshawar and Kohat districts (as we know, Pakistan's armed forces are made up of volunteers, and the average term of military service is 12 years). Evidently the number of Pushtuni serving in various military and paramilitary units and civil government establishments was not less (since at the beginning of the 1960's, according to official figures, this service was the source of livelihood of 40,100 persons just in the "tribal strip").

A description of the social structure of society in the NWFP would be incomplete if we failed to mention, if only briefly, such an important and unique element as the Pushtuni tribes.

The Pushtuni tribes (kaum or hel) today are unique relic communities, the preservation of which was promoted by certain features of the historical development of the Pushtuni people. One of them was the fact that for an extended period of time the Pushtuni did not have their own nationhood.

As a result the clan-tribal organization became the only force providing the peasants and artisans protection of life and property against predatory encroachments by the rulers of neighboring feudal states, and in recent times -- from colonialist schemes of annexation. The Pushtuni exploiter class also had a certain amount to gain by preserving it, since the traditions of the clan-tribal way of life masked class conflicts and offered the possibility of utilizing militia forces made up of a tribe's able-bodied adult males as an instrument of aggressive undertakings aimed at conquest. As a result the tribal organization became a unique, highly stable economic and administrative-political system, within the framework of which the labor and social activities of the bulk of the Pushtuni people were contained until quite recently (and frequently up to present time in the "tribal strip"). Division of land and water, assessment and levying of taxes and various one-time tax levies, enlistment and conscription into the army, etc, were performed on a tribal basis. Each of the Pushtuni tribes occupied its own, strictly defined territory, with grazing lands, cultivated farmland and fortified castles -- kala, serving as residences for chiefs of tribes and tribal subdivisions -- the khans and maliks (or myshr).

In the "tribal strip" (as well as in certain areas of the administrative districts) the Pushtuni tribes retain such elements of the traditional organization as the jirga -- council of elders (sometimes heads of families), which settles the internal affairs of the tribe or clan on the basis of customary Pushtuni law (pushtunwali). Relics of the clan-tribal military organization (lashkar) -- militia forces of all able-bodied males; and mutual labor assistance (ashar) are preserved. In some places the custom of wesh is still preserved -- periodic land redivision among the full and equal members of the community.¹⁹

Persistent vestiges of tribal organization which have been preserved to the present day exert considerable influence on social processes taking place in the NWFP. Pushtuni landowners and entrepreneurs, tribal khans and maliks, and the ulama actively utilize these carryovers in their own interests, endeavoring to prevent unification of the Pushtuni toilers on a class basis.

In the Dera Ismail Khan district as well as in Hazara, the Pushtuni dwelling there continue even today to view themselves as lords and the local non-Pushtuni farming population as their khamsaya, that is, tributaries and vassals, since the forebears of these non-Pushtuni were either subjugated during the migration of Pushtuni into these areas or had voluntarily placed themselves "under the protection" of the Pushtuni conquerors. As for the khamsaya themselves, quite frequently they consider themselves obligated to pay land rent to the local Pushtuni landlords not because the latter are the private owners of the land farmed by the khamsaya as lessees but because these landlords are khans and maliks of the Pushtuni tribes to which (tribes) the khamsaya are obligated to give a mala'kara ("master's portion") of the harvest gathered from this land, as the tribes are viewed as the supreme owners of all the lands in a given

area. These relic notions help the khan holding dominion in a given Pushtuni tribal area (even if the Pushtuni do not comprise a majority of the population) become the area's political "boss." In the "tribal strip" the khan of the dominant tribe is essentially the only possible leader; none of his fellow tribesmen would even attempt to question his authority (it is for good reason that during the 1970 general elections in the tribal strip the khans and maliks had no opponents in their districts).

Peasant leaseholder disturbances broke out in the 1970's in Peshawar and Mardan districts, disturbances led by the "Mazdur Kisan Parti" ("Worker-Peasant Party").²⁰ Even these disturbances, however, were tinted in the colors of tribal strife. This is due to the fact that the majority of landowners (including small landowners) in these areas are of the Yusufzaya tribe; as for the peasant leaseholders, they include very many members of the Momand tribe, especially in the northern part of Peshawar district. The result was that the large Yusufzaya landowners succeeded in giving an agrarian conflict the character of intertribal clashes.

The situation in the NWFP is negatively affected by the custom of blood vengeance (badal). Usually the causes of conflicts which run on for years are the "three Z's" ("zar, zan wa zamin," that is, "gold, women, and land"). There are frequent cases, however, where the deep and lasting interests of the propertied Pushtuni elite lie behind these clashes, interests connected with political rivalry, struggle for power, etc. Then the hostility between various tribes, taking on a protracted and persisting character, draws thousands of people into the fray.

The relations between some tribes (for example, parts of the Orakzaya and Turi, who are Shiites) and their neighbors are complicated not only by intertribal but also religious enmity, which also frequently erupts into protracted bloody clashes. There is evidence that at the end of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's the khans of Swat and Dir vigorously and with some success aroused intertribal conflicts on the territory of these districts in order to halt the growing democratic movement.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more detail see "Pakistan. Spravochnik" [Pakistan, A Reference Book], Moscow, 1977, pp 30-39.
2. For more detail see T. Dzhabborov, "Severo-Zapadnaya pogranichnaya provintsiya" [North-West Frontier Province], Moscow, 1977.
3. "The Fourth Five-Year Plan. 1970-1975," Islamabad, 1970, page 558.
4. "NWFP, 1972-1976," Islamabad, 1976, pp 21-22.
5. "Population Census of Pakistan, 1972, Census Bulletin No 1," Islamabad, 1973, page 4.

6. For more detail see Zubeida Khatoon, "Institutional Agricultural Credit in Former NWFP," Peshawar, 1966.
7. See, for example, DAWN (Karachi), 30 May 1972; THE PAKISTAN TIMES, 23 August 1972.
8. At the beginning of the 1970's industry in the NWFP was producing 32% of all the sugar produced in Pakistan, 23% of tobacco products, and 20% of canning industry output.
9. The Peshawar district produces almost 100% of the output of the metal-working, printing, leather, construction and paper industries, 80% of the output of the furniture industry, 70% of the food processing, chemical, shoe and garment industries, and 50% of the province's textile industry output (for more detail see T. Dzhabborov, "Development of Factory Industry in Pakistan's North - West Frontier Province," "Ekonomicheskoye razvitiye Pakistana" [Economic Development of Pakistan], Moscow, 1974, pp 145-176.
10. For more detail see Nurul Islam Mian and Fazal Qadir, "Small-Scale Enterprises of the NWFP," Peshawar, 1965.
11. "Census of Pakistan. Population, 1961," Vol 3, Karachi, pp VI-15.
12. For more detail see "NWFP, 1972-1976," pp 16-18; Akbar S. Ahmed, "The Tribal Areas," Karachi, 1977, pp 53-55.
13. Jagir -- privileged land grant free of all taxes.
14. Yu. V. Gankovskiy, "Narody Pakistana. Osnovnyye etapy etnicheskoy istorii" [The Peoples of Pakistan. Principal Stages of Ethnic History], Moscow, 1964, pp 217-220.
15. It is characteristic that in 1951 7,400 of the 8,100 landowners of the administrative districts of the NWFP were engaged in entrepreneurial activities in various areas of nonagricultural production (including 3,600 in commerce). See "Census of Pakistan, 1951," Vol 1, Karachi, Table 15, pp 15-2.
16. At the beginning of the 1960's 4,300 of the 5,900 businessmen and merchants in the Peshawar area were also landowners.
17. G. F. Papanek, "Pakistan's Development. Social Goals and Private Incentives," Cambridge, 1967.
18. This process was investigated in S. F. Levin, "Formirovaniye krupnoy burzhuazii Pakistana" [Forming of Pakistan's Upper Bourgeoisie], Moscow, 1970.

19. Akbar S. Ahmed, op. cit., pp 11-22, 39-41.

20. See for example, THE PAKISTAN TIMES, 9 Sept 1972, 27 Jan 1973,
23 Feb 1973.

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INTERNATIONAL

ERNST GENRI DISCUSSES HIS NEW BOOK ON CHINESE POLITICS OF AGGRESSION

Moscow KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIY in Russian No 49, Dec 79 p 5

[Article by Ernst Genri: "Politics of Aggression"]

[Text] The publishing house of the Novosti News Agency has just published the book by Ernst Genri, "Kitay Protiv Azii" [China Against Asia]. Its author is member of the USSR Union of Writers, the oldest international affairs publicist and a laureate of the Prize imeni V. V. Vorovskiy for best works in the field of international journalism.

Ernst Genri's fame was gained with his books published in the 1930's, "Gitler nad Yevropoy" [Hitler over Europe] and "Gitler Protiv SSSR" [Hitler Against the USSR]. This was followed by his publicistic works, "Politika Voyennykh Monopoliy" [The Policy of Military Monopolies], "Yest' li Budushcheye u Neofashizma?" [Is There a Future for Neofascism?], "Mogot li Kommunisty i Sotsialisty Idti Vmeste?" [Could Communists and Socialists Come Together?], "Zametki po Istorii Sovremennosti" [Notes on Contemporary History], "Novyye Zametki po Istorii Sovremennosti" [New Notes on Contemporary History], and others. He was recently awarded the diploma of laureate of the prize of the Novosti News Agency for 1979 for his book, "Razoruzheniye: Kto Protiv?" [Disarmament: Who Opposes It?], which has already had two editions.

Following is the content of his latest book described by the international-affairs publicist on the request of the editors.

My small book is an attempt to answer a question which disturbs a number of people, both in our country and abroad. What is the secret of China's current aggressive policy, a policy which for years has amazed the entire world?

Why is it that a country which 30 years ago began a transition to socialism in front of everyone has now become the most bellicose and restless state in the world? Why did it find it necessary to attack Vietnam and so rudely and provocatively break with the Soviet Union, which from the very beginning was helping it all it could?

No one could deny that as early as the beginning of the 1960's the road to progress, unparalleled in China's millenia-old history, was wide open. No one threatened the Chinese, and in the comity with the other socialist nations their interests had been secured once and for all. Nevertheless, Mao Zedong and his groups took a different, entirely opposite way--the way of a malicious anti-Soviet and anti-socialist policy. As is universally known, their heirs today behave in precisely the same fashion.

I consider that the key to this puzzle is the plan formulated in deep secrecy by Mao Zedong and those close to him, even before their assumption of power in Beijing after World War II.

The plan called for the creation of a certain Asian (and, in the future, not only Asian) superpower headed by China, covering most of the continent, stretching from the Pacific Ocean almost to the Caspian Sea, and from the Indian Ocean to the Bering Sea, containing over one-third of the earth's population.

Agreed, this does sound like a wild fantasy. However, the people of our age have already long noticed that nothing which may appear fantastic should be discounted in the history of our time. Suffice it to recall what occurred in the 1930's and 1940's, when mankind encountered another, no-less-insane plan for the creation of a global empire. Let it not be forgotten that Hitler as well called himself a "socialist," even if he prefaced it with the word "national." The Maoists call themselves communists. It turns out, however, that this is merely a mask put on by frenzied chauvinists. Today we could even label them racists.

In chapter after chapter of the book I describe the great imperial Maoist designs, citing documentary data, including their own statements which have leaked to the outside. Thus, for example, in 1964, in a conversation with Japanese political figures, stating that Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and Kamchatka became Russian territories "only a hundred years ago," Mao Zedong said: "We have not as yet submitted the accounts on this list."

That is not all. The reference book, "China. General Information," recently published in Beijing in English, contains a list of territories allegedly "historically" belonging to China. In addition to the Soviet area along the Amur and the Primor'ye, the list includes Sakhalin, part of Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the Mongolian People's Republic, part of Vietnam, and other territories.

Formulating such plans, the Maoists are following the steps of the old Chinese emperors and even the Chiang Kai-shekists who in their time also

dreamed of creating their superpower. In a book published in Taiwan in 1973 the Chiang Kai-shekist Zhang Yanzan claimed, for example, that the word "Siberia" comes from the word "Xian," the name of the most ancient Chinese aborigines "who spread along the basin of the Yenisey in the Stone Age." In other words, China's "right" to Siberia dates from the Stone Age!

The Maoists are undertaking the implementation of their great-empire plan in Southeast Asia. Hence, in their view, China's further progress will be to the west, in the direction of Burma, India and the Near East. Meanwhile an expansion is being planned north of China and in the direction of the Pacific.

A reader following the events could see the way the Maoists are trying to implement their plans in Asia. In the forefront of this expansion, at the same time a conspiracy is being prepared with American imperialism. Preparations are being made for such a conspiracy with the Japanese militarists coming out of their swoon. Attempts are being made to purchase the latest armaments in Western Europe. Overtures are being made to the West German revanchists and a non-stop press and radio bombardment of the Soviet Union is continuing. Maoism is definitively converting into a sui generis variant of anti-communism.

Its real final objective is the enslavement of the world. In this connection, in reality, the Beijing leaders do not distinguish among individual countries, continents or nations. They are aspiring toward global hegemony. To them Asia is merely the beginning.

In the first half of the 1930's this author published two books exposing German fascism and its plans for the creation of a superpower, beginning with the conquest of Europe, and subsequently hurling itself against other continents. As we mentioned, at that time this too seemed phantasmagoric. However, Hitler's plan was a fact. Is there anyone unaware of this today?

Like many others, at this time I am led to think and write about Maoist China ever more frequently. I have no doubt that its policies are doomed to infamous failure. Yet, it would be hard to predict what the cost of this failure would be to mankind.

That is how the situation regarding the PRC's foreign policy of the 1980's is shaping up. China against Asia and against Europe. Above all, however, China against itself.

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INTERNATIONAL

DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES EXAMINED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 1, 1980 signed to press
21 Dec 79 pp 31-36

[Article by V. Sheynis, candidate of economic sciences: "Differentiation of Developing Countries: Outlines and Scales. I."]

[Text] "Unity in variety"--that is perhaps the persistent characteristic of the developing world. Although the historical fates of the countries composing it have been essentially different (the period of existence as a national state of some of them has exceeded 150 years, that of others--and the majority of them--does not exceed 2-3 decades), it is precisely yesterday or even more broadly--the historic epoch under which a line was drawn by the downfall of the colonial system of imperialism, and also today's difficulties and problems deriving to a great extent from the past which determine a number of fundamental features of their unity and to a certain extent level out their positions in the world.

"To a certain extent"--the reservation is not formal. In all areas of social life, and especially in economics, there are manifested--with the course of time more and more distinctly--strong tendencies toward differentiation of the developing world. The problems that arise in different countries, and the main thing--the ways, possibilities and prospects of their solution, and the formation of modern society--are different. There are weighty grounds for assuming that the importance of such differences in the 1980's, as in past decades, will not diminish, but will increase.

A typology stable enough to serve as a tool of analysis for at least a number of years, to present a dynamic, not a static picture, sufficiently flexible to absorb into itself the main, sometimes very varied, characteristics of over a hundred countries is needed for the reflection of this process. Of course, any grouping simplifies reality, for each country, even the smallest, includes a whole world of unique phenomena. Nevertheless, the number of works offering ever-newer variants of classification is constantly increasing [1].

In Soviet and foreign investigations and in publications of international organizations, the developing countries are very often subdivided by

continents and regions. Such an articulation gives a certain general orientation for the study of socio-economic processes: Latin America appears as a very developed region, the Near East as that which has advanced most in recent decades thanks to oil, Southern Asia as a region with very difficult demographic and foodstuff problems, etc. It also is difficult to neglect the generalized regional statistics of the United Nations, the enumeration of which in another grouping is at times impracticable.

Intensifying differentiation in the developing world is evident even when countries are grouped on a regional basis, but the picture obtained is too rough. Countries with similar socio-economic characteristics appear to be scattered over different regions, and on the contrary, side by side with each other appear states having not so much in common: Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Nepal and India, Singapore and Kampuchea, Argentina and Haiti. By the same token, not only is the degree understated but the directions of the actual differentiation of the developing world are distorted.

1

The classification proposed by us corresponds to the analytical task of the given article--that of showing the exceptional heterogeneity of the developing countries and the profound differences between them from the point of view of the level of economic development at the turn of the 1970-1980's. Therefore, as the authors of "Typology of Non-Socialist Countries" we have selected as the main criterion of classification the level of development of productive forces, which finds expression in a number of averaged economic indicators (the gross national product, industrial production, percentage of leading economic structures in the structure of the gross national product and employment, etc). Classifications intended for other tasks (for example, determination of the probable prospects of socio-political development) naturally will be based on other criteria and indicators. Our variant, however, advances to the foreground the level of development of productive forces as the most stable, objective, obvious and verifiable characteristic, and the one least subject to spasmodic changes.

However, the productive forces do not function outside a definite system of production relations, and the most important productive force of society--especially under present-day conditions, is the "human factor." Therefore in our classification the character of their socio-economic development (which can, for example, find expression in the level and forms of capitalism) and the type of socio-cultural, historic development--a category which cannot be specially examined here but which predetermines important differences between groups in some cases and inside groups in others, are not only indirectly present but also introduce certain modifications into a specific grouping of countries. It is a matter of materialistically interpreted different historical civilizations, each of which differs in its set of system-forming characteristics.

We have expanded the spatial boundaries of the analysis contained in "Typology...", increasing the number of classified developing countries from 61

to 113-142 (depending on the presence of statistical data) and have attempted to trace the process of differentiation dynamically, taking 1950 as the initial year and 1976 as the final year. Such a substantial expansion of the framework of the investigation involved certain losses: the number of indicators on the basis of which the level of development of productive forces is verified was reduced, and in their series a special place was occupied by the indicator of per-capita income or product, which indirectly characterizes the labor productivity achieved for society on the whole and, in our view, is very suitable for the rough classification of developing countries according to the level of economic development and for effective monitoring of shifts occurring in that area [2].

In the process of grouping, the indicator gross national product per-capita [3], by means of which the main lines (more or less provisional, of course) of delimitation were designated between the "upper," "intermediate" and "lower" echelons of developing countries, was constructed with consideration of a number of other indicators that refine the concept of the level of economic development; we also gave attention to the trustworthiness of the exchange rates in translating national monetary units into dollars, the rates of economic growth in recent years, etc. As a result, some countries placed in "marginal zones" on the basis of the value of the per-capita product were transferred to a higher or lower level.

Still, countries and groups of countries, often greatly different in type of social development, sectorial and reproductive structure of the economy and in a number of other important characteristics--the economic potential, position in world economic relations, etc), have been placed in one and the same echelons.

At first glance such a lack of correspondence disqualifies the indicator of per-capita product as a tool of classification. Actually, however, it is only that not one, but several types of socio-economic structures, as a rule, correspond to the value of the per-capita product in a definite range. However, in the final account there are not many such variants for each range, and they themselves can be placed in a two- or multi-stage classification scheme, the primary contours of which are drawn by means of the per-capita product indicators. Especially considerable differences are observed on the "poles" of the developing world--in its upper and lower echelons.

As a result we obtained seven basic groups of developing countries, distributed over three echelons, an articulation that permits analyzing the process of differentiation in a very general form (see Table 1). The proposed classification, although not exhaustive, in our view more adequately reflects the contemporary state of the socio-economic differentiation of the developing countries than the schemes contained in the latest publications of the UN, UNCTAD and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Before characterizing the main groups of developing countries it is necessary to note two more important aspects. Firstly, besides the level of

Table 1. Typology of countries and territories of the developing world

Latin America and Caribbean	Near and Far East	Southern and Southeast Asia	Africa	Oceania
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Group I. Countries of semi-developed capitalism (15 countries)

Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Jamaica, Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, Chile

Lebanon, Cyprus, Singapore, Hong Kong

Group II. Oil-producing countries (11 countries)

UAR, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Iran, Iraq, Brunei, Libya, Gabon

Group III. Very small countries and territories with a high per-capita income (19 countries)

Bermuda, American Virgin Islands, Bahamas Islands, Netherlands Antilles, British Virgin Islands, Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Barbados, Surinam, Montserrat

Reunion, Djibouti, New Caledonia, Guam, American Samoa, French Polynesia, Fiji, Gilbert Islands

Table 1. (Continued)

Latin America and Caribbean	Near and Far East	Southern and Southeast Asia	Africa	Oceania
Group IV. "Upper middle" (29 countries)				
Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Paraguay, Colombia, Guyana, Belize, Grenada, Santa Lucia, Saint Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla	Turkey, Syria	Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, Macao	Algeria, Ivory Coast, Namibia, Tunisia, Mauritius, Ghana, Angola, Rhodesia, Congo, Seychelles Islands	American Pacific Ocean Islands
Group V. "Lower middle" (35 countries)				
El Salvador, Honduras, Bolivia, Antigua, Dominican Republic, Saint Vincent	Jordan	Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka	Swaziland, Zambia, Botswana, Morocco, Nigeria, Cameroon, Egypt, Liberia, Senegal, Mauritania, Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Mozambique, Kenya, Sao Tome e Principe, Equatorial Guinea, Cape Verde, Comoros	Papua-New Guinea, New Hebrides, Kuku Island, Tonga Island, Samoa, Solomon Islands

Intermediate echelon (64 countries)

Table 1. (Continued)

Latin America and Caribbean	Near and Far East	Southern and Southeast Asia	Africa	Oceania
Group VI. Countries with large populations and a low level of income (3 countries)				
		Indonesia, Pakistan, India		
Group VII. Least developed countries (30 countries)				
Haiti	Yemen, South Yemen	East Timor, Afghanistan, Burma, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Kampuchea, Maldives	Uganda, Central African Republic, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Guinea, Tanzania, Benin, Somali, Nigeria, Zaire, Malawi, Lesotho, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda, Upper Volta, Burundi	

Lower echelon (33 countries)

The countries in each of the listed groups are arranged, as a rule, in the order of decreasing value of the gross national product per capita in 1975.

general economic development and a number of socio-cultural indicators more or less corresponding to it there exists still another factor of differentiation that is of exceptionally great importance. We have in mind the orientation of social development in those young states--and most of them are--where the capitalistic method of production has not yet formed on a national basis. The general orientation toward socialism or capitalism declared by the leadership of those countries does not always represent a fairly stable equivalent of many forces, as a rule, is not strictly correlated with the level of economic development and deserves special analysis that goes beyond the framework of the present article.

A second comment relates to the role of the dependence of developing countries on the main centers of world capitalism. In principle the position of the exploited periphery of the capitalist world, the dependent path of development, the arbitrary character of the different forms of socio-economic life comprise a complex that does not differentiate but unites the developing countries. But the dependence, exploitation and "secondary character" of the socio-economic processes in those countries with time appears in more and more varied forms. For it is a matter not only and even not so much of qualitative as of quantitative differences. Therefore it seems to us be an extremely rectilinear thesis that "closer relations with state-monopolistic capitalism correspond to great dependence, great dependence in the final account to great relative backwardness, which in turn leads to great dependence, etc" [4].

This problem can hardly be solved in categories of "more" and "less." "The method of robbery," wrote Karl Marx, "is again determined by the method of production. For example, a nation with developed exchange speculation cannot be plundered in the same manner as a shepherd nation" [5]. In a dialectical unity and mutual influence of backwardness and dependence intrinsic today to the developing countries, the degree of backwardness of the productive forces, including also "the human factor," is the leading element that determines not simply the scales of exploitation and the degree of dependence (in relatively more developed countries they can be both greater and smaller than in less developed) but rather their character. And this is not a leveling but a differentiating characteristic of no little importance.

2

What do the main groups of countries drawn in for analysis represent with respect to the level, structure and direction of economic development?

The upper echelon of those countries with respect to a whole series of important parameters even now is quite distant from a majority of the states of Asia and Africa that form the "core" of the developing world. The capitalistically oriented countries of that echelon in various ways resemble (in certain respects, at least) the state of developed capitalism. A common feature of them is a relatively high level (according to the measures of the developing, and sometimes also the developed capitalistic

states) of per-capita product, as a rule, more than 1000 dollars in current 1976 prices (when converted at the official exchange rates), and a number of characteristics connected with them. However, the differences between groups of the upper echelon are perhaps no less substantial than the features of their similarity.

The first group includes the economically most developed countries of Latin America (whose share is from 3/4 to 4/5 or more of the territory, population, gross national product, industrial production and gold reserves, and 2/3 of the foreign trade turnover of the Latin-Caribbean region) and small enclaves in the Near and Far East. The relatively high level of per-capita product reflects in most of those countries a wide distribution of industrial forms of labor and is combined with a relatively differentiated sectorial structure of the economy. The capitalistic structure in most cases is not simply the leading one, but a system-forming one (or even the one that has formed the system), which has been formed into a social method of production; the state sector of the economy represents a form of state capitalism; in a number of countries national monopolies have arisen and an unusual variety of state-monopolistic capitalism is forming. All these states have wide or, what is still more important in the given case, varied connections with the world capitalistic economy. To their share falls the great majority of industrial exports, and also exports of capital of the developing countries. They represent the main area in which the activity of the TNK [expansion unknown] has turned beyond the limits of developed capitalistic states. In some cases the formation of unusual subimperialistic structures has started here.

A distinctive common denominator for all (or almost all) countries of the first group is the path of socio-economic and cultural development, which reproduces, even if in a strongly modified form, the experience of the cultural-historical development of the European nations. Of course, here too there exists, at times in an impressive volume, specific problems intrinsic to the developing world as a whole: a predominance of pre-industrial forms of labor in agriculture, weak inclusion in scientific and technological progress, screaming social contrasts--extreme poverty of the masses of the population, the parasitism of wealth incapable of being converted into capital, etc. But they are being transformed more and more into problems typical of the capitalistic countries properly speaking, where all the contradictions are lined up around the main one, "labor-capital." The most probable "candidates" for emergence from the developing world are present in that group. Strictly speaking, even now their belonging to it is rather provisional: this is one of the two main branches of the intermediate group of semi-developed capitalism in the non-socialistic world (the other branch is the underdeveloped periphery of Western Europe).

In our opinion the 11 oil-producing countries form a second group in the upper echelon [7]. Their distinctive characteristics are a high level of per-capita income; as a rule, exceptionally large potential of development, determined mainly by unique resources and to a certain extent geographic position; enormous export of capital and raw materials. However,

the highly productive (and unusually profitable) oil extraction and oil refining, and in a number of countries, certain branches of industry and infrastructures corresponding to them, including also the social, are whimsically combined with an enormous mass of pre-industrial forms of production and with social structures that are sometimes the most backward in the developing world. Being dependent on the receipt of modern technology from abroad, they have managed to oppose the very large international oil monopolies with a unique counter-monopoly in the world capitalistic market, raw materials market and financial resources. The "asymmetry" of dependence intrinsic to the relations of developing and developed capitalistic states is not so distinct in this case.

The path of socio-historical development traveled by the peoples of those countries in the middle of the 20th century differs essentially from the European. This gives the social structures now forming here a qualitative uniqueness difficult to express by any sort of formal indicators but which make a profound impression also on such universal, rapidly penetrating forms of contemporary socio-economic life as the capitalistic organization of the economy, the state mechanism of economic regulation, the motivation of social behavior, value orientations, etc.

A great deal has been said about the backwardness of many of those countries and the preservation of routine pre- and semi-feudal social structures in them [8]. In the emirates of the Persian Gulf the rapid growth of the modern sphere of production and servicing has caused an enormous inflow of manpower, not only from contiguous but even from Far Eastern and Latin American countries. The attraction of immigrant workers is a phenomenon that has accompanied accelerated economic growth in many countries, and almost everywhere it has created complex social collisions. In some cases, however, they have acquired contemporary European forms (with all the contradictions that capitalism generates, of course), and in others, Asiatic, pre-bourgeois forms of caste pyramidal stratification, in which a considerable portion of the indigenous population (transformed into a minority in the Persian Gulf emirates) obtains ultra-modern goods, almost without participating in the economic process.

Does the high level of per-capita income say anything at all as an indicator of the level of development in such conditions? In our view that is an indicator of very important processes in both the economy and socio-cultural life which it is very erroneous to ignore. A highly productive economic mechanism, no matter what its structure, origin or place in the national economy may be, started to function in the countries under consideration recently, and the effect of high income has not yet succeeded in being adequately manifested. But recent events in Iran have shown that the fertilization of medieval social structures (even of those that have been subjected to some reformation in the course of a "revolution from above") with a golden rain of "petro-dollars" does not occur with impunity.

Where will development go further? Is it possible to preserve (or recreate) a society based on rigid standards of the shari'a if the flow of income

from the world market in the form of rent and other payments will, it can be assumed, be fairly abundant in the course of a number of decades. Will those incomes be used to create a modern productive apparatus embracing the entire economy (the uniqueness of the position of the given group of developing countries consists in the fact that the limits of financing of the process of accumulation have been removed here or at least widely extended) for the actual improvement not only of the material but also of the social position of the masses of the workers? Or will they flow along the channels of the parasitic consumption of a privileged minority, be expended on prestige projects, reinforce foreign political ambitions and in a considerable portion of them will, as up to now, be recycled into the economy of the West?

Only time is capable of answering those questions. Some oil-producing countries (Libya and Iraq) have declared their non-capitalistic choice, although the gap between economic and social processes make themselves known here (true, in different forms). Perhaps the circle of those countries will be expanded. But in the meanwhile, in most of those states, especially in those burdened less than others by an unwieldy "train" of pre-capitalistic structures in the countryside, some important prerequisites have been very rapidly formed for accelerated development a specific or, in the felicitous expression of G. I. Mirskiy, "neo-orthodox" [9] variant of capitalism.

The rapprochement of the capitalistically oriented oil-producing countries to states of developed capitalism appears to be far less organic than that of countries of the first group, it was spasmodic and on a different scale. Nevertheless, in the foreseeable future those oil-producing countries, in any case, according to the main economic and socio-cultural indicators, are moving a considerable distance from the main mass of the developing countries.

A special place in the upper echelon is occupied by dwarf states and territories with a high per-capita income (as a rule, higher than in most countries of the first two groups) and a population of less than 0.5 million. In type of social development some of them, mainly Latin American, gravitate towards countries of semi-developed capitalism. Others, for example Reunion or Djibouti, like oil-producing states of the second group, preserve a sharply expressed dualistic structure [10]. A role similar to oil production is played here by the plantation of tropical crops, important infra-structural objects of international use, etc. With the small numbers of the population of that type the incomes imitate the fairly high level of nationwide labor productivity.

In evaluating the place of very small states in the developing world and the prospects of their economic growth it should be emphasized that such categories as the national mechanism of reproduction, the scientific and technological potential, the differentiation of the sectorial structure, etc., are in general inapplicable to them. They have been able to achieve a relatively high level of per-capita income only by incorporating, in a very profound manner, economic activity within the country in the international capitalistic division of labor and, as a rule, using as a basis an influx

of foreign capital impressive in relation to their size. The prospects of the socio-economic development of very small territories that are in other, lower echelons evidently will depend in a decisive manner on whether variants of international specialization similar to those that exist in countries of the third group are successfully reproduced in them.

The "upper middle" group of the intermediate echelon--the fourth in our classification--includes countries with a level of general economic development medium for the developing world: with a per-capita product fluctuating in the range of 550-1000 dollars in 1976 prices (the mean-weighted indicator for the developing world on the whole is 520 dollars), with a weakly differentiated sectorial structure and with a predominance of pre-industrial forms of labor in all sectors with the exception of the relatively limited export sector and small-in-number, as a rule, enterprises of the manufacturing industry that serve the domestic market. Whereas contemporary structures predominate in the structure of the gross national product of most of those countries (although to a different degree), in the structure of occupation traditional forms either dominate or occupy a very large place.

In a social respect that group (like the one following it) is less homogeneous than those considered above. It includes several countries with a socialist orientation in both of the main variants (examples of the first variant are Syria and Algeria, and of the second, Angola and Congo, the leaders of which have proclaimed a scientific socialism of state ideology).

In most of the capitalistically oriented countries belonging to this group capitalism either has already been transformed into a system-forming formation or is on the path toward such a transformation (although beyond the framework of capitalistic forms of the economy there still remain more weighty and less eroded sectors of pre-capitalistic production than in the countries of the first group). In some countries (rather an exception here) capitalistic development led to the monopolistic stage of concentration on a local basis.

However, in the countries of this group capitalism appears in three variants that differ rather substantially from one another. The first of them, which we will call the Latin American, has had a very long historical "probationary period" and is experiencing the very strong influence of models of the United States and Western Europe. Its analogue, on a higher level, is the semi-developed capitalism of the Latin American countries.

The second, "Asiatic," variant is most clearly represented by South Korea and Taiwan. It arose on the crossing of a relatively recent but massive inflow of high-technological foreign capital and the social traditions of Asiatic society, which had a developed statehood in the past and has completed the unique "school" of Japanese colonial domination. Its analogues in the higher echelon are Singapore and Hong Kong, which are similar in the profile of economic (above all, industrial) development but do not experience the pressure of the rural periphery.

The third, "African," variant is developing in the conditions of a society with an especially sharply expressed dualistic structure (a very characteristic example is the Ivory Coast). A number of African countries in this group have been and still remain the arena of considerable European colonization and forms of the economy introduced by it (Rhodesia and Namibia, and in the past, Tunisia).

A quite special place in that group of developing states is occupied by Turkey, which is incorrectly combined in some classifications with the countries of Southern Europe. Turkey, in our opinion, has not yet emerged on the level of countries of semi-developed capitalism, although some prerequisites for that have been formed there. The quasi-bourgeois society "developed" in the West and the capitalistic economy of Istanbul and the Aegean coast still have a powerful counterbalance in the form of the Anatolian countryside, which makes a profound impression on the economy, the politics and the socio-cultural life of the country.

Factors of internal social development and the forces of the world capitalistic economy and differences in the forms of inclusion in the international division of labor and the scales of the inflow of foreign capital are working mainly to disrupt this group. It includes probable candidates, if not for emergence from the developing world, then for movement to its higher echelon.

The fifth, "lower middle," group combines countries with a level of productive forces low even for the developing world: the indicator of per-capita product in most of them varied in 1976 in the range of 250-550 dollars, the sectorial structure is weakly or extremely weakly differentiated even in the large countries and pre-industrial forms of labor predominate everywhere. An equilibrium of modern and traditional structures is observed in the best case in the structure of the gross national product, and in the sphere of occupation, an absolute dominance of pre-capitalistic formations. The domestic market is poorly developed. National private-property capitalism in most countries of this group had still given only weak shoots. The differentiating characteristics within this group are approximately the same as in the preceding group, with the important difference, however, that not many countries occupy stable positions in the world market, the inflow of foreign capital is still more selective and the economic potential of development can be evaluated as medium in most countries, and as fairly low in some.

However, subgroups ("blocs") of countries, more or less close in type of development and socio-cultural structures to the blocs on the upper levels, can also be found here. Within the framework of such "verticals" that cut through all "stages," El Salvador, Honduras, Bolivia and a number of very small territories can be placed: the vertical at the apex of which are Singapore and Hong Kong, and in the middle Taiwan and South Korea, is continued by the Philippines and Thailand; some characteristic features of the Turkish set of characteristics, which is unique on the whole, can be

found in Egypt; adjacent to the small bloc of African states of the fourth group leading in economic development (the horizontal boundary here is especially provisional and mobile) is a fairly large group of countries of Tropical Africa--from Zambia to Kenya.

In the lower echelon of the classification scheme are countries of the sixth and seventh groups. The average level of per-capita product in them is so low (less than 250 dollars in 1976) and is increasing so slowly that at times it does not assure even the physical minimum of means of existence of a considerable, at times the larger part of the population. The traditional formations predominate in the structure of occupation everywhere and in a decisive manner in the structure of production, in most of the countries. National capitalism as an isolated economic formation arose only in large countries where the absolute dimensions of the market created the determining soil for that. In the economic development of many countries of this group situations arise periodically in which the inflow of resources from abroad in the form of so-called assistance becomes a condition not only of expanded but even of simple reproduction. The presence of important natural resources in some of them is neutralized by serious economic disbalances and the pressure of demographic growth.

Although differences in the levels of socio-economic development within horizontal countries in principle weaken with transition from more to less developed groups, in the lower echelon two essentially different groups of states must be distinguished from one another.

One of them (the seventh in our classification), rather numerous, coincides in the main with the list of least developed countries with low income and limited resources, established by the United Nations in 1971 and supplemented in 1975. In the make-up of that group, in turn, one can distinguish such countries as Butan, Nepal, Rwanda and Burundi, the economies of which have a rather closed character (these, as a rule, are the most backward of the least developed countries), and countries more or less actively participating in the international division of labor and having valuable resources, which creates some prerequisites for change of their economic status in the next few years, although it will not be easy for them to achieve that. The capitalistically oriented states of this group have not been very successful either in the development of national private property capitalism or in attracting foreign capital. At the same time, countries with a socialistic orientation encounter difficult problems here that constrain their economic growth.

A very obvious characteristic that requires the distinguishing in the lower echelon of a special (sixth) group consisting of a total of three states (India, Pakistan and Indonesia) that have, however, over 40 percent of the population of the developing world, is their size. (Let us note, however, that the large dimensions of a country are only a prerequisite of essential economic characteristics that can also not be realized; a clear example of this is Bangladesh). Massive gross indicators give an economy, even one

with low average per-capita values of production and consumption, a certain new quality; they permit creating modern sectors and enterprises, determine the capacity of the domestic market, advance respective countries to a noteworthy place in international economic relations and contribute to the inflow of foreign resources in the form of investments of foreign capital and "aid." True, the significance of the gross parameters and the economic potential of those countries is diminished by the sharp lack of balance of productive resources and the inadequate rate of accumulation; there are serious disproportions between the absolute size of contemporary sectors of the economy and their relative place in the economy. Nevertheless, in a number of important respects (this applies especially to structural economic indicators and the possibilities of their progressive change) the states of this group stand "higher" than many other countries not only of the lower but, possible, also of the intermediate echelon, for the conditions of their economic and social existence are to a great extent unique.

A special place in the sixth group and in the developing world in general is occupied by India--a country so unusual that combining it with any states in a typological group is rather provisional. The exceptionally large dimensions of the productive apparatus of the country and the impressive size of the mass of accumulation, the old cultural traditions, the long period of development of bourgeois relations in the cities and regions of intensive agriculture, the centralization of enormous resources in the hands of the government and some other aspects have permitted India, where the average level of per-capita product is one of the lowest in the world (141 dollars in 1976), to have, along with archaic forms of production, labor, capital, consumption, life, value orientations, etc, large industrial enterprises producing means of production, to launch a satellite, to start creating nuclear power engineering and to advance a pleiad of brilliant scientists who have been awarded international prizes, including a Nobel Prize.

And still, in spite of the specific paths and possibilities of development of especially large countries, together with the least developed states they form a zone in which the very difficult problems of the developing world are most acute, and evidently will be for a long time.

Such--in a very general form, of course--are the directions and outlines of differentiation of the developing countries by level and type of development of the productive forces. In a second article we will try to determine the scales of this phenomenon: the relative weight of the different groups and the size of the gaps between them.

FOOTNOTES

1. We will refer only to the fundamental Soviet work, "Tipologiya nesotsialisticheskikh stran" ("Typology of Non-Socialist Countries"), (Moscow, 1976), prepared under the leadership of L. A. Gordon, V. L. Tyagunenko and L. A. Fridman, the methodological-scientific importance

of which goes far beyond the framework of the specific grouping of the developing countries in the second half of the 1960's that is contained in it, and also to original variants of the classification of Asiatic countries advanced recently by N. A. Dlin and N. A. Simoniya [see N. A. Dlin, "Spetsifika sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya nesotsialisticheskikh stran Azii" (Specifics of the Socio-Economic Development of the Non-Socialist Countries of Asia), Moscow, 1978; "Ekonomika razvivayushchikhsya stran: teoriya i metody issledovaniya" (Economics of the Developing Countries: Theory and Methods of Investigation), Moscow, 1979, pp 198-210).

2. For more details on the possible criteria of classification and those expressing their indicators see our article in the journal *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA*, No 8, 1978. The development of multi-criterial systems of country classification (that is, those taking into consideration characteristics different in principle) is only taking its first steps. Up to now, typologies proposed in the scientific literature have been explicitly or implicitly based on some single criterion, more or less widely interpreted and expanded by a set of a large or small number of indicators that correlate each other. If other criteria were used, they were allocated an auxiliary role in the process of grouping.
3. For 1976, the last year for which a sufficiently representative set of data has been published.
4. "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy" (The Developing Countries: Regularities, Tendencies and Prospects). Moscow, 1974, p 41.
5. K. Marx and F. Engels. *Sochineniya* (Works). Vol 12, p 724.
6. Countries and territories were included in the scheme regardless of their legal status, membership in the UN, recognition or non-recognition by other states, etc.
7. They are by no means all OPEC members, who are incorrectly combined in some classifications. Thus, Venezuela for a number of principal socio-economic indicators is listed, not among the Near Eastern oil producers, but among the very well developed Latin American states. On the other hand, belonging to the number of oil producers is an important but still not a determining aspect of the socio-economic status of such countries as Indonesia or Nigeria.
8. See, for example: R. Andreasyan. "The petroleum enlightenment and the capitalistic transformation of Arabian monarchies." *AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA*, No 1, 1979.
9. See *KOMMUNIST*, No 2, 1976, p 111.

10. Three states with populations of less than 500,000 have been included in the oil-producing group on the basis of the profiled characteristic of economic development. Such crossings are unavoidable in any classification that takes several criteria into consideration. Let us recall once more that the boundaries between the groups are provisional.

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK ON COUNTRIES OF SOCIALIST ORIENTATION REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, 1979 signed to press 6 Nov 79
pp 195-199

[Review by N. A. Simonova of the book "Strany sotsialisticheskoy oriyentatsii. Osnovnyye tendentsii razvitiya" [Countries of Socialist Orientation. Principal Development Trends], by A. V. Kiva, Glav. Red. Vost. Lit-ry Izd-va Nauka, 1978, 288 pages]

[Text] It can no longer be said that the subject of the monograph being reviewed is any particular novelty or has been uninvestigated in Soviet Oriental studies. Evidence of this are the dozens of individual-authorship and group-authorship monographs, hundreds of articles and a great many discussions and debates both on individual countries of socialist orientation and on the problem as a whole. And yet at the same time one can state that for many years to come this problem will occupy the center of attention of the scholarly community. This is due not only to the exceptional significance of the phenomenon of socialist orientation from the standpoint of the interests of the world revolutionary process but also to the complexity and extreme conflictive nature of the practical affairs of the countries of this orientation.

One of the virtues of this monograph lies in the fact that its author has endeavored to show this complexity and conflictiveness both at the comparative (comparing manifestations of socialist orientation in different countries) and at the single-country level. This approach makes it possible to avoid extremes in assessments. The fact is that in discussions on this problem there has long existed the tendency to pick out individual aspects (either positive or negative) of the societal development of countries which have chosen a socialist orientation, or examples of individual countries and, based on these particular cases, to give a general (again positive or negative) appraisal of the phenomenon as such. This intensifies and at times aggravates to an extreme the polemical nature of the discussion, but it by no means promotes clearing up the problem under discussion.

Another virtue of A. V. Kiva's monograph is the fact that a general theoretical approach to socialist orientation is combined in it with analysis of practical sociopolitical and economic reforms in specific developing countries, which finds expression in the structure of this study.

The first section of the monograph -- dealing with theory -- examines a group of questions connected with typology (variance) of socialist orientation and its correlation with other forms of revolutionary processes which lead to socialism, and with the internal conflictiveness of the phenomenon being analyzed. Of definite interest is statement of the questions of criteria of socialist orientation, development of a national democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, and the preconditions (objective and subjective) for embarking upon the path of socialist orientation.

A. V. Kiva polemicizes with certain existing, sometimes even widely asserted points of view on many aspects of the addressed problems. In many cases the positions defended by the author seem fairly convincing to us, while in others they are insufficiently argued or highly debatable, although interesting. In any event it is a useful scholarly debate, and the book leaves the door open for further discussion.

In our opinion, for example, the idea about the qualitative heterogeneity of different groups of countries of socialist orientation (page 46) is extremely fruitful, as is statement of the question of "the noted tendency of development of a national democratic into a popular democratic revolution" in one of the groups of these countries (page 47). It is true that the author is not always consistent in citing concrete examples to illustrate the theses he advances. For example, on page 46 Tanzania is listed by the author as one of the countries of socialist orientation "in the broad meaning of the word" (with which one could in general agree), while on page 51 (and in a number of other places) this same country is characterized as belonging to a different subgroup.

One can acknowledge as correct A. V. Kiva's refinement of a previous attempt¹ at typology of revolutionary democracy. The author correctly notes that "in those countries which are least developed from a socio-economic respect revolutionary democracy frequently places emphasis on distinctiveness, traditionality, on 'its own special' socialism" (page 57). At the same time we should like to point to the need (this applies not only to the author of this study) of greater preciseness and clarity in utilization of established terminology. The point in particular is that in this monograph the terms "ruling national democracy," "ruling petit-bourgeois democracy," and "ruling revolutionary democracy" are employed as equivalents (pp 38-39, 54, 62, etc). This evokes some objections.

The first applies to use of the terms "national" and "revolutionary" democracy. The author correctly points to the existence of two views on

the relationship between these categories. According to one of them, both terms are equivalent, while according to the author they are qualitatively different. Kiva himself speaks decisively in favor of the first approach. But having made his choice, in this book he alternately employs the two terms, and sometimes both together. This is hardly capable of creating a favorable impression on the reader.

My second comment applies more broadly, to methodology. I believe that it is incorrect to equate "revolutionary democracy" and "petit-bourgeois democracy," since the former is only part of the latter and is qualitatively different from its other parts. The term "petit-bourgeois democracy" was always employed in Marxist-Leninist literature to designate the political currents and political representatives of the class of the petite bourgeoisie. Just as the class it represents, petit-bourgeois democracy is fragmentary to the highest degree. Within it one can isolate as a minimum a liberal and a rightist-socialist faction, which are inclined to follow a policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie; a reactionary-bureaucratic and a reactionary-clerical faction, which endeavor to establish "rigid" dictatorships of fascist or theocratic ilk; revolutionary democracy, which focuses on its own, subjectively interpreted socialism, as well as various leftist and reactionary-utopian socialist trends. Of all these categories, only consistent and sincere revolutionary democracy is capable of focusing a country toward socialism (although this by no means signifies that such a potential is mandatorily realized). It is therefore clear how important it is precisely to separate the two terms.

Likewise we feel that it is impossible to equate the terms "national" and "revolutionary" democracy. The very term "national" indicates that one is dealing with a political, but extraclass or intraclass category. And if there is any sense in introducing this term into scholarly discourse, it is apparently not for the purpose of creating a synonym for the already existing term "revolutionary democracy" but rather to designate a conglomeration of forces (organized into an opposition or in power) in which not only different factions of the petit-bourgeois democracy are united, but also certain factions of bourgeois and sometimes even as yet immature proletarian democracy. This is why the rule of "national democracy" cannot in our opinion be equated with socialist orientation. In order for the latter to become possible, it is essential to pass through a series of stages of class and intraclass delimitation (initially with bourgeois democracy, and subsequently with rightist factions of petit-bourgeois democracy proper).

The interest of specialists will unquestionably be evoked by A. V. Kiva's proposed division of the historical process of noncapitalist development into three stages (pp 74-81). At the first or initial stage, in the author's opinion, primarily general democratic reforms take place, which only in certain aspects also possess an anticapitalist hue. The second stage is the stage of stabilization of socialist orientation and deepening of the social character of the reforms, which is naturally also

accompanied by aggravation of the class struggle. In the third, pre-socialist stage of development, general democratic reforms begin to yield supremacy to anticapitalist.

In the theoretical section of this monograph the author also examines in detail concrete-historical forms of entry by the Afro-Asian countries onto the path of socialist orientation as well as questions pertaining to providing the social base for a revolutionary-democratic regime. A. V. Kiva on the whole shares views on these questions previously presented in Soviet Oriental studies. He makes what in our opinion is an important additional statement that "the character of reforms in noncapitalist countries, their depth and consistency, the degree of participation of the masses in these transformations, the breadth of the social base of the new regime and the very problem of reversibility of a national-democratic revolution are connected to an enormous degree not only (and in a number of instances not so much) with the scope of the revolutionary movement prior to a revolution (military coup), but also with how revolutionary events evolve after the revolution and how the new authorities channel the dissatisfaction of the masses with their status under a proimperialist, neocolonialist or other reactionary antipopular regime" (page 64).

At the same time we feel that the author of the monograph has not entirely felicitously illustrated the theoretical points with the example of Ethiopia. We shall begin with the fact that A. V. Kiva proceeds in his deliberations from the assumption that some view the revolutionary process in Ethiopia as a "revolution from above" and then convincingly argues that if this is in fact correct, it is only "partly so" (page 69).

We believe that Ethiopian realities since 1974 provide us with a vivid example of an "ascending revolution," that is, a revolutionary process in the course of which political power transfers from pro-monarchy forces -- through a number of intermediate stages -- to leftist-radical forces which have proclaimed a socialist orientation. I should like to note in this connection that the "ascending revolution" variant is by no means mandatorily preceded by a mass (and particularly an organized mass) revolutionary movement. Many first bourgeois-democratic revolutions of the past began in the absence of such prerequisites, including the Great French Revolution of 1789-1794, to which K. Marx first applied the term "ascending revolution."² We are familiar with historical examples of revolutions which were preceded not by open aggravation of the political situation but mass revolutionary discontent which had been gathering under the surface for years, discontent which finally burst through on the most unexpected occasion and revealed itself in vigorous and spontaneous action by the masses. A sequential examination of historical events is especially important from a methodological standpoint when analyzing the "ascending revolution" variant. A. V. Kiva has complicated his task by fragmentary and not rigorously chronological presentation of the factual material. The events of September-December 1974 and even demarcation of the revolutionary democracy in Ethiopia in 1977 (pp 66-68) are examined in the monograph before the preceding stages of February-July 1974 (pp 69-70),

as a result of which the "ascending" character of the revolutionary process escapes the reader.

In the second section of the monograph the author examines some important problems of ideological-political development in the conditions of countries of socialist orientation. They include such problems as evolution of revolutionary democracy, forming of vanguard revolutionary-democratic parties, their typology, the role of the subjective factor and individuals in the historical process, etc. A. V. Kiva reaches a number of interesting conclusions. Meriting attention, for example, is his conclusion that creation of a unified democratic front behind the vanguard party "presupposes a comparatively high degree of organization and ideological cohesion of the ruling party and its broad tie to the masses." Otherwise this front, as "an organizationally shaped mass movement, can become a parallel center of political activity and be transformed into an opposition force to the ruling party" (page 111).

The third section of the monograph carries the reader into the sphere of practical realization of socialist orientation. Here the author synthesizes the most important social, economic and political reforms in the target group of countries. This of course does not signify that A. V. Kiva does not also raise theoretical questions in the chapters of this section. This is attested by his addressing of the problems of the community and its role in agrarian reforms in countries of socialist orientation, as well as certain other questions.

Perhaps Section IV, "Capitalist and Anticapitalist Tendencies," is constructed less felicitously. The chapter on capitalist trends falls simply outside the general subject of the monograph. The chapter on nationalism would be more appropriate in the second section, while the chapter on factors operating against capitalism would be more appropriate in the first section.

A number of the above remarks were evoked by the fact that the very subject of the monograph is profoundly "problematical," subject to debate. These remarks do not alter the fact that A. V. Kiva's book unquestionably promotes further more profound study of the problems of socialist orientation. It is favorably distinguished by the boldness of the author's search and opinions, his willingness to take account of what has already been achieved by his colleagues and critically to reexamine some theses. Acquaintance with this monograph should be both interesting and beneficial to the reader.

FOOTNOTES

1. See N. A. Simoniya, "Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiya" [Countries of the East: Paths of Development], Moscow, 1975, pp 349-351.

2. It seems to us that A. V. Kiva's reference to the more vivid and rich "palette of Egyptian political life prior to the 1952 coup of the 'free officers' (in comparison with the political life in Ethiopia prior to 1974)" (page 65) is not entirely correct, and for the reason that the existence of such a "palette" within the milieu of a comparatively narrow stratum of politically active populace in a few cities is not equivalent to mass revolutionary ferment and discontent.

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NATI GAI

DUTY OF MINISTRY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS TO MONITOR STANDARD OF LEADERSHIP

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jan 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Communists of the Ministry"]

[Text] The solutions to crucial problems facing our economy are inextricably related to further improvement of administration of the national economy. What with the expanding scale of production and the increasingly complicated economic ties it is especially important for the work of ministries and departments to be purposeful.

The party shows constant concern about making sure that planning and economic agencies operate efficiently and energetically and consistently achieve high results in each area of the economy. This is the more necessary now when at the November (1979) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee a number of ministries and departments were sharply criticized for the fact that they were not able to overcome the force of inertia and resolutely and completely change all work in the direction of quality and increase labor productivity.

"No matter which part of the work one takes," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the plenum, "everywhere one sees immense possibilities and immense reserves for successful advancement. But in order to take advantage of them we must raise the level of administration in the broadest sense of these words."

In our country we have developed a comprehensive program for improving planning and increasing the influence of the economic mechanism on the efficiency of production and the quality of work. The implementation of this program will help to ensure more efficient utilization of existing reserves and possibilities of growth, to introduce scientific and technical achievements and advanced practice into production extensively and to put an emphasis on intensive growth factors.

Practice shows that this work is done most successfully when party organizations of the ministries take the initiative and act aggressively. Thus communists of the Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building ac-

tively contributed to the situation whereby the branch changed over to a progressive form of planning the wage fund and the numbers of specialists, which makes it possible to increase the motivation of the collectives of enterprises to produce products with a smaller number of workers and to accelerate the assimilation of new kinds of items. This method produces a significant increase in the volume of output as a result of increased labor productivity. Organization of deliveries of batches of equipment with a high level of plant and installation readiness for construction sites has also become an important prerequisite for changing a branch over to better forms of planning.

But far from all party committees of ministries and departments are exercising proper control over the activity of the staff, consistently struggling to introduce progressive methods of management and supporting a search for optimal methods of production administration under the conditions of developed cooperation and specialization. Some people, while proclaiming the importance of working in a new way, actually reconcile themselves to inertia and show no real concern for raising quality indicators or increasing labor productivity. This pertains to no small degree to communists working in union ministries of ferrous metallurgy and construction as well as enterprises of heavy industry. When considering the tasks for the implementation of the decisions of the November plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, they earmarked ways of improving the matter. It is important to implement consistently the measures that have been earmarked.

A primary responsibility of party organizations of the sphere of administration is to achieve unwaivering observance of state and labor discipline at all levels. It is necessary to react sharply and quickly to cases of disruption of the established plans, eyewashing, and attempts to conceal blunders and to make the real situation look better than it is. It is precisely communists who should be the first to act resolutely against this. But they are still not always above it. Thus at enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Power Machine Building and the Ministry of the Timber Industry and the Goskomsel'khoshtekhnika of the Ukrainian and Kazakh SSR's they falsely increased the volume of products sent to the consumers. Nonetheless the party committees and communists of these ministries and departments did not take a principled stand against this harmful practice.

The creation in the ministry staffs of an atmosphere which makes it possible to realize the creative potential of each worker more fully depends largely on communists. The arsenals of party organizations of administrative agencies have many tested means of helping to develop skilled organizers who have initiative, who are concerned about the matters entrusted to them and who have a completely responsible attitude toward their work. It is necessary for workers of the ministries to take a critical approach to that which they have achieved and accomplished. This is why it is important in party committees and at meetings of communists to make an exacting analysis of mistakes so that the criticism is not abstract and so that in each case it is clear who specifically is responsible for the failure to carry out one assignment or another.

Such a situation of mutual exactingness has not yet been created everywhere. The deputy chief of the administration for material and technical supply of the USSR Ministry of Light Industry, A. Kokorev, for example, gave an incorrect instruction concerning the shipment of products which ended up in the hands of dishonest people. They were subsequently held criminally liable. But even when this case was revealed, the communists did not take a principled stand against the misdemeanor of A. Kokorev, a member of the CPSU. Only at the insistence of the Committee of Party Control under the CPSU Central Committee did the ministry party committee give a strict reprimand to this now already former manager. This kind of lack of principle can not be tolerated.

The art of administration presupposes that a worker of any staff of a branch has such qualities as good ideological training, professional competence, and a constant need to master new knowledge and the achievements of advanced practice. It is the duty of party organizations of ministries and departments to be concerned in all ways about further improvement of political and specialized training of personnel and to support their initiative in this matter.

The party considers improvement of the management of the economy to be a large economic and political task. It is clear that without good management, measures that have the goal of increasing efficiency and improving the quality of work can not produce the proper result. Strengthening the avant garde role of communists of ministries and departments, increasing their responsibility for the achievement of good results in the branch and skillfully utilizing reserves for increasing production constitute an important guarantee of successful implementation of the plans of the final year of the five-year plan and the five-year plan as a whole.

FEDOSEYEV EXPLAINS CAMPAIGN TO SPREAD RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

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[Article by Academician P. Fedoseyev]

[Text] The true socialist solution of the national problem in our country--the elimination of all forms of inequality among nations and the establishment of friendship and fraternal cooperation among nations--is of universal-historical significance. The scale and importance of this problem may be determined by the fact alone that today there are about 160 states in the world and over 2,000 nations, nationalities and ethnic groups. According to some linguists people express themselves in over 7,000 different languages. Obviously, this includes dialects. In any case, however, it is entirely clear that the majority, one could even say the overwhelming majority, of nations, nationalities and ethnic groups live in multinational countries. Therefore, by virtue of this fact alone the national problem holds a very important position in social life.

With full justification we are proud of the fact that national relations in the USSR are characterized by the all-round blossoming of each nation, on the one hand, and processes of their natural rapprochement and cooperation and the shaping of a new historical community--the Soviet people--on the other. Thanks to the Leninist national policy of the CPSU all socialist nations were able to achieve tremendous successes in their economic, social and spiritual development, including the area of national cultures and languages. At the same time the fraternal cooperation among socialist nations and nationalities and their joint efforts to develop a single national economic complex within our country and upgrade its scientific and technical potential, and their increased contribution to the treasury of Soviet culture insure the steady upsurge of the power of the single multinational state--the USSR. At the present stage of development of our society the task of the socialist national policy is, above all, to harmoniously to combine international with national interests, and to develop and strengthen the new forms of relations among them, created by life itself.

The historical successes of our country in the solution of the national problem may be justifiably equated with victories in the building of the

new society in the USSR, such as industrialization, collectivization and cultural revolution. Let us emphasize, in this connection, that the solution of the national problem became possible only thanks to the elimination of the private ownership of productive capital and of the exploiting classes, and the establishment of social unity based on the alliance among the working class, the peasantry and the people's intelligentsia.

The working class plays a leading role in the socialist reorganization of the country, the solution of the national problem and the establishment of the sociopolitical unity of society and total equality among all nations. The CPSU, which rallied all Soviet people under the banner of proletarian internationalism, was the ideological inspirer and political leader of the working people. Under the leadership of the CPSU, and with the selfless and comprehensive help of the Russian people, all previously oppressed nations and nationalities in our country surmounted their former backwardness and reached the peaks of contemporary civilization.

The creation of single, multinational state--the USSR--tremendously accelerated the development of the country's national economy and the equalization of the levels of economic development of the national republics and oblasts. "The unification of the Soviet republics within the USSR," stipulates our Fundamental Law, "multiplied the efforts and possibilities of the peoples of the country in the building of socialism."

The fraternal friendship and mutual aid and cooperation among the peoples of the USSR in all fields of social life withstood the test of time and strengthened and tempered in the struggle for the Soviet system, in the constructive toil of the first five-year plans, in the difficult circumstances of the Great Patriotic War, and in the hard times of the restoration of the economy destroyed by the war. Today our reality offers a number of most vivid examples of friendship and cooperation among the peoples of our homeland in the building of communism.

Under developed socialist conditions the national policy of the CPSU is based on the firm theoretical foundation laid in V. I. Lenin's works. He clearly saw the possibility for drawing the nations together under socialism. He spoke of their merger, bearing in mind, above all, their voluntary unification within a single multinational socialist state. Lenin pitted the voluntary unification and rapprochement among nations against annexations, forced assimilation, and coercive annexation of nations by imperialist countries. "The objective of socialism," he wrote, "is not only the elimination of the division of mankind into small countries and separate nations, and not only the rapprochement among the nations, but their merger" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 256). Lenin emphasized that the total liberation of all oppressed nations and their right to self-determination is a necessary prerequisite for the voluntary and democratic drawing together and merger of the nations.

Substantiating the programmatic stipulation of the party on the national problem, Lenin wrote: "The proletarian party tries to establish the

biggest possible state, for this is to the advantage of the working people. It strives toward the rapprochement and further merger among nations. However, it wishes to achieve this objective not through coercion, but exclusively through the free and fraternal alliance among the toiling and working masses of all nations" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 31, p 167).

Lenin's statements on problems of national-state construction also reveal that by the voluntary merger of nations under socialist conditions he meant not the elimination of national differences, but the closer unity and fraternal alliance among socialist nations. National differences, Lenin pointed out, "will be retained for quite a long time, even after the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat on a universal scale" (ibid, vol 41, p 77).

Accordingly, the CPSU program stipulates that following the victory of communism in the USSR the rapprochement among nations will become even greater. Their economic and ideological comity will grow, and the common communist features of their spiritual appearance will develop. "However, the elimination of national differences, linguistic in particular, will be a considerably longer process than the elimination of class boundaries."

Lenin's theory of the national problem and national policy were developed and concretized further in the decisions of CPSU congresses and party Central Committee plenums, the legislative acts of the Soviet state, and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's addresses, particularly on the occasion of the celebration of outstanding historical dates, such as the victory of the Great October Revolution, the founding of the USSR, and the drafting and adoption of the USSR Constitution. The principles governing the economy and placement of production forces on a national scale, and measures to improve national-state construction, were elaborated and implemented in accordance with the Leninist national policy. The conclusion of basic importance of the appearance of a new historical community--the Soviet people--was comprehensively substantiated. The experience in the development of national cultures and the establishment of a single Soviet culture was theoretically summed up. The Leninist ideas of socialist patriotism and internationalism were developed.

The most important theoretical problems of national relations, the historical experience in resolving the national problem in the USSR and the processes of development and rapprochement among nations under socialist conditions have become subjects of the close attention of the Soviet scientists, including those in the union republics. In recent years the social scientists have displayed considerably greater interest in such problems. Successful theoretical science conferences were held in connection with the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR in Moscow and the capitals of union republics, such Tashkent, Alma-Ata, Baku, Dushanbe, Yerevan, Tbilisi, Kiev, Tallin, etc. They considered a number of important aspects of the improvement of national relations under the conditions of a mature socialist society.

Definitive collective works were published on the basis of studies and conference materials. Let us name, among others, major works, such as "Leninizm i Natsional'nyy Vopros v Sovremennykh Usloviyakh" [Leninism and the National Problem Today] (Politizdat, Moscow, 1974); "Natsional'nyye Otnosheniya v SSSR na Sovremennom Etape" [National Relations in the USSR at the Present Stage] (Nauka, Moscow, 1979); "Torzhestvo Leninskikh Iдей Proletarskogo Internatsionalizma" [Triumph of the Leninist Ideas of Proletarian Internationalism] (Nauka, Moscow, 1974); "Istoricheskiy Opyt KPSS v Bor'be za Ukrepleniye Mira i Druzhby Mezhdru Narodami" [CPSU Historical Experience in the Struggle for Strengthening the Peace and Friendship among Nations] (Politizdat, Moscow, 1977); "Deyatel'nost Kommunisticheskikh Organizatskiy Zakavkaz'ya po Internatsional'nomu Vospitaniyu Trudyashchikhsya" [Activities of the Communist Organizations of the Transcaucasus for the International Education of the Working People] (Sabchota Sakartvelo, Tbilisi, 1977); "Internatsional'noye i Natsional'noye v Sotsialisticheskoy Obshchestve" [The International and the National in the Socialist Society] (Naukova Dumka, Kiev, 1977); "Velikiy Otyabr' i Natsional'nyy Vopros" [The Great October and the National Problem] (Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Press, Yerevan, 1977); "Sovetskiy Narod i Dialektika Natsional'nogo Razvitiya" [The Soviet People and the Dialectics of National Development] (Elm, Baku, 1972); "Voprosy Natsional'noy Politiki KPSS v Usloviyakh Razvitiya Sotsializma" [Problems of CPSU National Policy under Developed Socialist Conditions] (Kartya Moldovenyaskv, Kishinev, 1977); "Sovetskiy Narod--Stroitel' Kommunizma" [The Soviet People--the Builder of Communism] (Kyrgyzstan, Frunze, 1977); "Mezhnatsional'nyye Svyazi i Vzaimodeystviye Kul'tur Narodov SSSR" [International Relations and Interaction Among the Cultures of the Peoples of the USSR] (Eesti Raamat, Tallin, 1978), and many others.

Let us note with satisfaction that the scientific works done on this problem have involved all detachments of social scientists (historians, economists, sociologists, philosophers, jurists, ethnographers, philologists and psychologists). What is particularly important is that of late the process of creative integration of research in this area has been accelerated noticeably. This has resulted in the extensive development of comprehensive works on central topics produced through the joint efforts of specialists in various fields of knowledge. This has made it possible to undertake a more profound study of the correlation between class and ethnic and national and international aspects, and to depict more completely the dialectics of interaction among the different facets of the lives of the peoples of our country.

However, we cannot be satisfied with such achievements. The CPSU Central Committee and, personally, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev have drawn our attention to the fact that we must constantly keep in sight all processes related to national relations, study them profoundly, and promptly draw the necessary practical conclusions. We must improve the economic and political forms of fraternal cooperation among nations and insure conditions for the further development and drawing together of socialist nations.

Clearly, the all-round study of problems related to the appearance of the Soviet people should be the starting point for scientific studies of national relations. The Soviet people are a historically developed new social and international community. It is based on the indissoluble alliance among the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia, with the leading role of the working class, on juridical and factual equality, and on the fraternal friendship and cooperation among all nations and nationalities in our country.

The authors of some works have allowed vagueness or misinterpretations in the treatment of such matters. Naturally these should be corrected. On the one hand, views that the Soviet people are a certain new single nation and that the merger of nations would mean the disappearance of national distinctions gained a certain popularity. This view leads to the conclusion that the appearance of new historical community--the Soviet people--would result in its absorption of the current socialist nations and their disappearance. In fact, the new historical community does not void the existing nations or build some kind of superstructures above the nations, but conversely provides a model of the unification among people of different nationalities, while the nations and nationalities, their originality, their language and their culture are preserved. Furthermore, as a new historical community, the Soviet people are an organic and effective form of development and blossoming of the material and spiritual forces of each nation and nationality.

In his speech on the draft of the USSR Constitution, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev firmly rejected the concept of a "single Soviet nation." "The socio-political unity of the Soviet people," he underscored, "does not in the least mean the disappearance of national distinctions." The steady drawing together and reciprocal enrichment of the spiritual life of nations are based on the successes achieved in the building of communism. However, the artificial acceleration of this objective process should not be allowed.

Occasional trends which may lead to national-cultural exclusivity and to restraining the processes of internationalization of social life or of its various aspects are a peculiar reaction to hasty theories of unification and disappearance of nations.

Naturally, both extremes present a certain danger unless countered by the active development and dissemination of the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the problem of national relations under developed socialist conditions.

The main direction to be followed in the studies conducted in this area may be formulated as follows: What are the prospects for the further development of nations and nationalities under conditions of developing internationalization of all aspects of social life, and what are the ways and means for strengthening friendship and cooperation among nations in the process of the gradual growth of socialism into communism?

The party program and the policy in the field of national relations is to pursue the road to achieving the full unity among nations and nationalities not by belittling or eliminating their sociocultural autonomy, but on the basis of their progressive rapprochement and the creation of maximally favorable conditions for the development of each one of them. Such is the dialectics of national relations at the stage of the developed socialist society building communism. Marxist-Leninist science proceeds from the fact that a communist society will have neither classes nor separate social groups. All traces of class differences will disappear, while national distinctions will remain for a long time under communism as well.

We can see that under mature socialist conditions the processes of the all-round development of socialist nations are accelerated. The steady growth of the economy and scientific and technical potential of the republics within the overall economic and scientific and technical complex of the Soviet Union and the development of national socialist statehood and culture and native languages are prerequisites and means for national development. At the same time the processes of internationalization, i.e., the systematic rapprochement and all-round cooperation among all Soviet peoples, and the strengthening of their fraternal, unbreakable friendship, are intensified in the developed socialist society. The single material and technical base of socialism, the single all-union state, and Soviet culture, socialist in content, national in form, and international in nature, and the extensive dissemination of the language of international communication are all factors which lead to accelerated internationalization.

The development and rapprochement among nations is not separate and parallel, but interrelated processes expressing the single international nature of the socialist society. The ways and means of national development and rapprochement among nations are created only simultaneously, in a state of organic interaction. That is why it is very important for the development of the entire potential of the nations to be optimally combined with internationalization processes. This requires the profound study of the economic, sociopolitical and cultural conditions governing the further development of nations and their systematic drawing closer.

Let us admit that many aspects of economic life of national republics and oblasts have not been as yet adequately covered and theoretically interpreted. A profound study is needed of the establishment of the Soviet people as a new historical community, particularly of the conditions governing the gradual elimination of differences among the basic social groups within our society and the establishment of its total social homogeneity. The study of the sociopsychological and moral aspects of national and international development is particularly lagging.

The building of the material and technical base of communism presumes the strengthening of the single nationwide national economic complex. This is an important factor in further strengthening the friendship and cooperation

among all our nations and nationalities. At the mature socialist stage the task of equalizing the levels of economic development of the Soviet republics has been essentially implemented: each of them today is making a substantial contribution to the all-union economy. Our researchers must comprehensively determine the role which the rational location of production forces which took into consideration the requirements of the socialist state as a whole and the upsurge of the former national outlying areas played in this equalization. Engaged, on a broad front, in the scientific prospecting for natural resources, the socialist state undertook the intensive development of industrial complexes in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Transcaucasus, Siberia, the Far East, the Volga area and the Urals, in order to surmount the backwardness of these areas, whose population in the past largely consisted of oppressed nations.

Despite all noticeable changes which have taken place in the study of this problem, including studies in union republics, a great deal remains to be accomplished. In particular, insufficient studies have been made of aspects of interrepublic and interoblast economic cooperation and integration, particularly in the area of the management of big national economic complexes. The same could be said of the elaboration of a system of indicators and methods for defining and comparing the levels of socio-economic and cultural development of the republics. Currently it is extremely important to study and properly assess the processes of equalization of these levels. Occasionally such work is reduced to determining the equality among one or another individual indicator. However, we must take into consideration that there can be no absolute equality of all indicators. The living conditions of the peoples and the nature of their economic development, based on climatic characteristics and natural resources, distance from industrial and cultural centers, and so on, vary. However, this does not exclude, but conversely, presumes the comprehensive development of the economy of each republic: all its economic sectors are components of the single all-union national economic complex.

In this connection the question arises of the correlation between the domestic sources of development of one or another republic or nation and sources available to the entire country through the achievements of other fraternal peoples. It is only with the joint planned utilization of natural resources on a countrywide basis, in accordance with the needs of the Soviet Union as a whole and of its national republics and oblasts, that we could successfully resolve the problem of the progressive development of Soviet society and of all its nations and nationalities. The study of the economic foundations of international unity and rapprochement among socialist nations is one of the topical tasks of the Soviet social sciences.

The equalization of the social structures of the Soviet republics and, particularly, the fast growth of the working class in republics where, in the past, the share of the workers within the population was far lower than in the central areas of the country, may be considered a qualitatively new phenomenon. Whereas for the Soviet Union at large the number of workers

rose by a 13.7 factor between 1924 and 1978, it rose by a factor of 33.4 in the Uzbek SSR, 35.1 in the Kazakh SSR, 43.1 in Kirgiz SSR, and 42.6 in the Tadzhik SSR. The significant increase in the number of skilled cadres in the republics has been a noteworthy trend. Whereas in the past some republics had no industrial and scientific and technical intelligentsia, today they have large detachments of engineers, technicians, agronomists, physicians, scientists and specialists in all economic sectors.

The headlong growth of higher and secondary education achieved in all republics and, particularly, where great lagging existed in the past, was a decisive prerequisite in this respect. This is confirmed by the following data:

Higher and Secondary (Complete and Incomplete) Education
per 1,000 People Employed in the National Economy

	<u>1939</u>	<u>1976</u>
USSR average . . .	123	767
Uzbek SSR	61	779
Kazakh SSR	99	770
Tadzhik SSR . . .	45	737
Kirgiz SSR	56	763
Turkmen SSR . . .	78	795

(See "Narodnoye Obrazovaniye, Nauka i Kul'tura v SSSR" [Public Education, Science, and Culture in the USSR], Moscow, 1977, pp 15-16; "Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR za 60 Let" [60 Years of USSR National Economy], Moscow, 1977, pp 57-58.)

The practice of national-governmental construction in the USSR is of universal-historical significance. The establishment of the USSR as a single union multinational state, based on the principle of socialist federalism, became a model of voluntary unification of the working of all nations and nationalities in the joint struggle for common interests and communist ideals. The implementation of the great Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism rallied all nations and nationalities of our country within a unbreakable union of free and equal nations. The new Constitution of the USSR and the constitutions of the union republics profoundly strengthened the democratic foundations of the national-state system. The principle of socialist federalism is implemented through the statute of union republics. In his report on the draft of the constitution

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev indicated the essentially erroneous nature of suggestions calling for limiting the sovereignty of union republics. Article 76 of the constitution reads as follows: "The union republic is a sovereign Soviet socialist state united with other Soviet republics within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The rights of the union republics are protected by the USSR. New rights granted union republics have been added and codified in the current constitution: the right to participate in the solution by union organs of problems within the jurisdiction of the USSR and the right to initiate legislation in the USSR Supreme Soviet. This demands of us further work on the socioeconomic and legal problems of the contemporary stage of national-governmental construction.

The moral-psychological climate is a major factor in the strengthening and development of the Soviet people as a historical community. The study of the manners in which national relations are reflected in the minds and moral lives of the Soviet people is of great importance. In this case we must determine more specifically the organic combination between the national and the international in the public and individual awareness.

Today national characteristics are manifested most noticeably in the fields of culture, language, national self-awareness, national mentality, way of life, traditions and customs. It would be erroneous to assume that the rapprochement among nations leads to the elimination of all such characteristics. It could be said that never before have we had such rich opportunities for the development of national factors and for their renovation and enrichment. However, we must understand truly profoundly the occurring processes and know what they are leading to and how to control them. Let us take as an example the matter of historical traditions. Never before have the people been so thoroughly familiar with the history of their nation and of other nations. Naturally, however, such histories have a number of not only positive aspects, but memories of former frictions, discord and conflicts.

The historian must display high principle-mindedness and true Leninist party-mindedness in order to be able to interpret historical events objectively and without prejudice, and thus contribute to the upbringing of patriots and internationalists. The present growing generation is drawing extensive information on the historical past of the nations from textbooks. A number of school aids and monographs have been published on such matters. Many novels, plays and poems have been written. A large number of motion pictures and television films have been made. However, it would be naive to assume that all this triggers only positive emotions and feelings.

Let us not fail to remember, for example, that some works give a one-sided interpretation of Peter the Great's age as a time of blossoming of the Russian state and society, entirely neglecting the most cruel oppression by estate owners and autocratic despotism. Some publications leave the impression that in the history of the Ukrainian people, for example, there has been no happier period than that of the Zaporozhskaya Sech', the nomad

roaming of the steppe, in the history of the Kazakh people, or the reign of one or another king or queen over the peoples of the Transcaucasus. One way or another, some works embellish the blood-thirsty conquerers of foreign lands and oppressors of nations. In an effort to flatter national pride, some historians classify the origin of one or another nation in the period of primitive-tribal organization, ignoring the fact that nations developed with the establishment of firm economic relations and economic communities in the epoch of capitalist ripening and development.

As we know, the Marxist-Leninists are not in the least against the preservation and development of national characteristics and traditions. Yet to begin with not everything in them is acceptable from the positions of proletarian internationalism and individual aspects may have an adverse affect on the social progress of the people and harm their fraternal relations with other peoples. Secondly, the communists are struggling for national development, but mandatorily on an international basis. It is precisely on the basis of internationalism that we decisively reject both national nihilism and national exclusivity. We support the all-round development of national life, and at the same time the all-round development of international principles. The development of such principles and the enhancement of their value in the life of the nations is not in the least the equivalent of sacrificing national development to international development, as our anti-communist adversaries claim. The entire matter is that what is truly international does not contradict in the least, but on the contrary, enriches the national life of nations. The very concept of national as well is not fixed, but is constantly changing and expanding.

Problems related to the cultural development of nations and the further progress of the entire Soviet culture should be studied extremely closely. Both central and republic scientific institutions have done extensive work to sum up the experience of the cultural revolution. Meaningful works have been published on the history and theory of socialist culture, characteristics of national-cultural construction and achievements of socialist nations and nationalities in the country in the course of their spiritual life. Particularly intensive work is being done on the interaction and reciprocal enrichment among national cultures at the present stage and the further spiritual rapprochement among socialist nations. The contribution of each nation and nationality to Soviet culture is steadily growing as their socialist national cultures develop. All Soviet republics are creating works of art which grow on the soil of the national culture, yet at the same time encompass an internationalist, an all-Soviet content, becoming the property of our entire society.

The blossoming of the literature and arts of all nations of the USSR under socialist conditions convincingly proves that the cultures of all nations and nationalities develop most successfully within the common stream of the internationalist socialist culture, encompassing everything valuable of the spiritual legacy of world civilization. In his speech "On the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of the USSR," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted that,

"Today we can say with full justification that our culture is socialist in terms of content and basic development; it is varied in terms of national forms and internationalist in spirit and nature." A steadily enriched Soviet culture, imbued with the ideas of the international fraternity among all peoples of our country is a great accomplishment of socialism and one of the means for the further rapprochement among nations.

The writing and publication of the six-volume "Istoriya Sovetskoy Mnogonatsional'noy Literatury" [History of Soviet Multinational Literature] (Nauka, Moscow, 1970-1974), covering the most important aspects of the development and rapprochement among socialist nations, is an example of fruitful collective creative work by scientists from the fraternal Soviet republics.

The current complex processes developing in the field of culture, including literature, cannot be understood without a profound analysis and summation of historical experience. As we know, the widespread cultural relations among the nations of our country have had a tremendous impact on the spiritual life of the masses. Russian classical literature played an outstanding role in the struggle against national prejudices and for consolidating reciprocal understanding and cultural contacts among the peoples of our country. A. S. Pushkin, the great Russian poet, perspicaciously thought of future times "when, having somewhat forgotten their quarrels, the peoples will join in a great family." He inspiredly praised the Ukraine, Georgia and Moldavia. He created immortal works imbued with warmth and friendship toward many peoples. "My great Caucasus, how I loved your sons . . ." wrote M. Yu. Lermontov, discovering the unique spiritual beauty of the people of this mountain area.

The Institute of World literature imeni A. M. Gor'kiy of the USSR Academy of Science was joined by literary experts from all fraternal republics in the writing of a multiple-volume work on the history of the literatures of the peoples of the USSR in the pre-October period. The completion of this work will constitute their further international contribution to domestic culture.

The multinational Soviet culture is fully consistent with the nature and principles of our society. Its internal unity does not mean the equalization of the national cultures of the peoples of the USSR. It is the great possession of the working people of all nationalities. The USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography imeni N. N. Miklukho-Maklay undertook a study on "Optimizing Socio-cultural Conditions of the Development and Rapprochement Among Nations in the USSR," following the example of the Georgian, Moldavian, Uzbek and Estonian SSR's and of some autonomous republics and oblasts in the RSFSR. The resulting materials eloquently prove that the Soviet nations have gained a number of common features and similar elements of culture and way of life. This change may be traced particularly clearly in the young people. Specific (ethno-sociological, above all) studies indicate that previous differences in the level and

intensiveness of consumption of various types of cultural goods by members of different nationalities have been virtually eliminated. In other words, the socialist nations not only have identical broad access to all types of culture, but profit from such opportunities equally.

The main conclusion based on such studies is that people of different nationalities share a common outlook. They are united by the common objective of building a communist society and by the internationalist principles of Marxism-Leninism, which are penetrating ever more profoundly the social consciousness and mentality of the people.

In this respect the Soviet educational system and ideological-educational work play an important role. The identical curriculums of the schools (above all in history and literature in secondary schools, and Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy, history of the CPSU and theory of scientific communism in the VUZ's) and materials disseminated through the mass-information media actively contribute to the molding of a materialistic outlook among people of all nationalities and to the gradual restriction of traditional concepts characteristic of previous times and of obsolete social systems (religious outlook, prejudices and so on).

Naturally, each nation and nationality has its national awareness and pride in the values it has created and its contribution to the treasury of world civilization, and above all the building of socialism and communism. At the same time, however, it is unquestionable that thanks to the joint solution of common social problems and the establishment of a new historical community, its member-nations have developed a common internationalist awareness based on socialist ideology, representing an alloy of common features within the national consciousness of each nation and nationality and common international values. The development of the internationalist awareness of the peoples of the USSR has reached a high level. We must make a profound study of its nature and role and correlation with national awareness. Emphasizing the need to energize the study of national consciousness, national mentality and national character, we cannot ignore the topical nature of the struggle against all manifestations of nationalistic prejudices and biases. We must study the spiritual life of nations and nationalities not only for cognitive purposes, but also for the sake of insuring the development of all forms of social consciousness on an international basis, and block the possibility for the development of negative trends.

Soviet culture is not non-national or monolingual. It is a multinational, multilingual culture. It is living and spreading in all the languages of the peoples of the USSR. Multilingualism creates certain difficulties in communications. Yet it symbolizes the spiritual wealth of Soviet society, acting as an inexhaustible source of the colorful and comprehensive expression of socialist culture. The development of national languages has become an important prerequisite for the outstanding achievements of the peoples of the USSR in the political-administrative, economic, cultural and

other realms of life. At the same time, the dissemination of the language of international communication is becoming ever more important. Russian became such a language by virtue of objective historical circumstances.

Struggling against the colonizing policies of czarist autocracy and bourgeois-liberal hypocrisy on the subject of the national problem, Lenin called for full linguistic freedom and equality. He deemed it the party's programmatic requirement to abolish a mandatory state language (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 24, pp 294-295; vol 25, p 146; vol 31, p 440; and vol 32, pp 142, 154).

The bourgeois liberals justified the need to preserve the privileged status of the Russian language as a state language with the statement that it is "great and powerful," for which reason all residents should know it. Objecting to the liberals, Lenin wrote: "To this, liberal gentlemen, we answer that all of it is true. We know better than you do that the language of Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevskiy is great and powerful. We wish more than you do that the closest possible contact and fraternal unity be established among the oppressed classes of all nations inhabiting Russia, without distinction. Naturally, we favor every resident of Russia's having the possibility to learn the great Russian language. The one thing we oppose is the element of coercion" (ibid, vol 24, pp 294-295).

Lenin explained in detail that a state language means coercion. This would not draw nations speaking other languages toward it, but on the contrary would alienate them from it. The policy of imposing a state language ignores the question of mentality, which is a particularly important aspect of the national problem. The dissemination of the Russian language as a language for international communication will be powerfully stimulated by economics, "which will make the Russian language necessary." Even the slightest coercion would "devalue, harm and reduce to naught the unquestionable progressive significance . . . of a single language" (Lenin, op cit, vol 48, p 234).

The Great October Socialist Revolution put an end to linguistic inequality which made the Russian language the privileged state language and which was coercively imposed upon non-Russian nationalities. Since the establishment of the Soviet system the Russian language lost all privileges or special juridical status. Its study and practice by people of non-Russian nationality is based on their free and voluntary decision. The spreading of the Russian language is determined by the fact that it is used by the majority of the country's population. The Russian language meets common requirements of economic and political life and of the scientific and technical and cultural development of all nations and nationalities in the USSR.

People of different nationalities live and work in the different union and autonomous republics, oblasts, cities and villages. A language for international communications is for them a necessary prerequisite for joint

work, social activities and daily life. Under mature socialist conditions the Leninist principles of national, including linguistic, policy are observed systematically. The principle of linguistic and national equality has been raised to the level of a constitutional article. "The citizens of the USSR," stipulates article 34 of the USSR Constitution, "are equal in the eyes of the law, regardless of origin . . . language . . . and other circumstances." The exercising of equal rights by the peoples of the USSR is insured by a policy of all-round development and rapprochement among all nations and nationalities, and "the possibility to speak their native language and the languages of other peoples of the USSR."

At the stage of developed socialism, and in the conditions of the further internationalization of all aspects of social life, a language for international communications becomes one of the important prerequisites for the further rapprochement and cooperation among the peoples of the Soviet Union, the development and reciprocal enrichment of national cultures and languages, and the all-round mastering and increasing the achievements of contemporary civilization.

The All-Union Theoretical Science Conference on "The Russian Language--Language of Friendship and Cooperation Among the Peoples of the USSR," held in Tashkent, at the end of May 1979, convincingly proved the need for organically combining the development and practicing of the native languages by all nations and the enrichment of their social functions, along with the extensive dissemination of the language of international communications.

The greeting presented by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the conference profoundly substantiated the national policy of the CPSU and the present role of the national languages and the language of international communications: "Under developed socialist conditions, when the economy of our country has become a single national economic complex and when a new historical community--the Soviet people--has appeared, the role of the Russian language objectively rises as a language for international contacts in the building of communism and the upbringing of the new man. Together with the native language, the free mastery of the Russian language, voluntarily adopted as a common historical possession of all Soviet people, contributes to the further strengthening of the political, economic and spiritual unity of the Soviet people."

The report by Comrade Sh. R. Rashidov, CC CPSU Politburo candidate member and first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Central Committee, and the subsequent reports and addresses comprehensively dealt with the basic theoretical problems and practical measures aimed at improving linguistic construction and the teaching of the Russian language in national schools, alongside the native languages. The conference discussed and passed recommendations presenting an integral system for the study of the Russian language from childhood and in all subsequent education stages.

The dissemination of the language for international communications is of great importance in terms of scientific and technical progress. In our time more than ever before, science and technology are international. Scientific and technical progress is a powerful factor in the development of nations and the internationalization of all aspects of their life. The exchange of achievements among scientific institutions of all our republics is a necessary prerequisite for the growth of the common scientific potential of the country. Without such interchange we would be unable to upgrade the scientific and technical potential of the republics and achieve the full organic combination of the advantages of developed socialism with the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution. For this reason we cannot consider normal the fact that a considerable percentage of works of a general scientific nature are published in the individual republics in the national languages only, for which reason, consequently, they can be used by no more than a limited number of readers familiar with such languages.

The development of the national languages and a broadening of their social functions to the extent to which even the most complex scientific disciplines may be presented in national languages was one of the greatest accomplishments of socialism and socialist culture. At the same time, however, the need to exchange scientific achievements with the help of a language of international communications is becoming ever more vital. It must be remembered that not only the most important studies of Soviet scientists, but the most noteworthy works written abroad are published in Russian. Foreign periodicals and printed matter on natural and social sciences are extracted in the Russian language. All this emphasizes the need for the extensive use of a language for international communications in the dissemination of scientific accomplishments in union republics and, particularly, our republic academies of sciences. For this reason it would be expedient to publish works of major scientific significance both in the national and the Russian language.

We proceed from the fact that considering the high level of development of national culture, of the national language in particular, which performs most extensive social functions, there are no reasons to assume that the publication of scientific works or the teaching of special subjects in Russian in higher educational institutions in national republics could somehow harm the national language or national culture.

The question of doing further work on the problem of the use and study of the Russian language in national republics has been repeatedly discussed at meetings of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium. It has also been considered at meetings of the council which coordinates the scientific activities of republic academies. In particular, the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Russian Language was instructed to develop together with the philology centers of the academies of sciences of union republics, a long-term program for scientific research and practical measures on the topic of "The Russian Language as a Means for International Communication."

The consistent use of the principle of bilingualism is the most important prerequisite for the successful functioning and dissemination of the Russian language as a language for international communication among union and autonomous republics. As we know, bilingualism, i.e., the fluent mastery of two languages, is quite widespread not only in our country, but in many other countries as well. However, in the conditions of a socialist society bilingualism rests on an essentially different foundation: it creates a linguistic environment in which the further development and enrichment of the national language takes place, along with the increased need to master the Russian language as a language for international communication.

However, it is important to continue to explain, purposefully and consistently, that under the conditions of bilingualism, of national-Russian bilingualism, no damage whatever is caused to the national interest. Conversely, a linguistic situation arises which leads to the harmonious combination of the international with the national aspects in the culture of a nation. Therefore, equal bilingualism, as one of the leading principle of linguistic construction in the USSR, must be further developed and extensively applied at the various educational levels, particularly in national schools and VUZ's.

Psychology and educational practice have confirmed the groundlessness of the previously existing view that the study of a second language in childhood hinders the mastery of the native language. In reality, bilingualism in the different grades of national schools, and the teaching of the Russian language, lead to the development of the type of natural atmosphere of live contacts which stimulates the development and enrichment of the native language and the fast mastery of Russian verbal skills. This eliminates a number of obstacles in the study of the language of international communication in the VUZ's of national republics.

At the same time greater attention must be paid to the theoretical elaboration of problems related to the teaching and study in school of the language of the native populations of union and autonomous republics. The development of national languages is not merely proof of their equality. The main thing is that knowledge and cultural values are mastered more easily and rapidly in the native language. The languages of all nations and nationalities in the USSR play a tremendous role in the successful development of culture, public education and training of national cadres in union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and okrugs.

It is important to emphasize that national-Russian bilingualism is being disseminated on the basis of equality of all other languages in the country and has been raised to the level of a constitutional norm. The linguistic policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state aims at insuring maximally favorable conditions both for the development of national languages and for the dissemination of the Russian language, and on this basis, the development of national-Russian bilingualism. The proper understanding of the role of

bilingualism and of the role of the Russian language in our multinational state unquestionably contributes to the dissemination, study and teaching of the language of international communication.

As the most outstanding indicator of the development of the national cultures, the linguistic wealth of the peoples of the USSR is the best rebuttal of the fabrications of the anti-Soviets concerning the "extinction" of national identity of the peoples of the USSR and the "standardization" of their cultures. It is worth recalling that it was only after the victory of the Great October Revolution that some 50 peoples in the USSR acquired their alphabets and built up highly developed literary languages. Today, in our country, schools teach subjects in 52 languages. The experience in cultural-linguistic construction in the USSR is a universal-historical accomplishment.

More than anywhere else the efforts of the scientific institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the academies of sciences of union republics, the academic branches of autonomous republics and the chairs of higher educational institutions is required in organizing studies on the national problems. In this respect our society greatly relies on the USSR Academy of Sciences National Council for Scientific Problems. The study of such problems presumes the use of union data, reference materials from the entire Soviet Union and republic sources characterizing results and processes of national development. That is why, along with the central scientific institutions, specialists from various fields in the national republics must be recruited.

Only thus could one surmount, on the one hand, the abstract and schematic nature of works frequently issued by central scientific institutions and, on the other, the trend toward excessive localization of the topic and nature of studies in the individual republics, occasionally resulting in the one-sided treatment of a number of problems. Unfortunately, it must be noted that in some studies of the history and the material and cultural development of individual republics the contribution of the entire country and of the multinational Soviet people to the progress of a given nation or nationality is insufficiently credited. Frequently the achievements of one or another union or autonomous republic is depicted separately from the general progress of the entire Soviet state.

The fact that statistical collections on the development of the republics sometimes either do not mention or do not adequately depict the tremendous and steadily growing contribution which the entire country makes to the national development of a given republic could be hardly considered proper.

One of the main principles in research is the consideration of the unquestionable fact that the achievements of our entire country, of the entire fraternal family of nations and nationalities of the USSR, play a determining role in the life and national development of each nation.

Historical dialectics is such that the all-round blossoming of socialist nations, on the basis of the implementation of the Leninist national policy, leads not to their separation but further rapprochement. We can proudly say that today not only the Soviet Union as a whole, but each constituent union republic is a joint family of working people of a great variety of nationalities, joined by the common ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the single objective of the building of communism. This is one of the vital sources of strength of the socialist society.

The Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism and inviolable friendship and fraternal cooperation among working people of different nations are embodied in the global socialist comity. New international economic and political relations, previously unheard of, have been established among the members of the socialist comity, based on common class interests and objectives, total equality, fraternal mutual aid and all-round cooperation. The principles of relations between the USSR and the socialist countries are codified in the Fundamental Law of the Soviet state as follows: "As a structural part of the world socialist system and the socialist comity, the USSR develops and strengthens friendship and cooperation and comradely mutual aid with the socialist countries on the basis of the principle of socialist internationalism. It actively participates in economic integration and in the international socialist division of labor" (art 30).

The study and summation of the historical experience and achievements of the world socialist comity in the development of a new type of international relations is the most important task of the social scientists in the socialist countries. It is natural that problems of socialist internationalism and the development of socialist nations assume an important position in the plans for international scientific cooperation.

The struggle against bourgeois and revisionist falsifications of the historical experience in resolving the national problem in the USSR and on the scale of the entire socialist comity, and criticism of the variety of various nationalistic and racist concepts remains a combat sector in the activities of social scientists.

In his time Lenin warned that the bourgeoisie and all petit bourgeois parties will try most stubbornly to divide the working people of different nationalities, promote mistrust and disturb the close international association and international brotherhood of workers. He was confident that through painstaking, adamant and purposeful work our party would be able to defeat the nationalistic intrigues of the bourgeoisie and all possible nationalistic prejudices, and give the working people the world over an example of a truly firm alliance among workers and peasants of different nations in the struggle for the elimination of the oppression of exploiting classes and the building of a new state, a new society.

The CPSU successfully resolved the great historical problem of establishing proletarian internationalism in the liberation struggle and the building of

SECRET

SHEVARDNADZE ADDRESSES HIGHER EDUCATION MEETING

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 24 Jan 80 p 1

[Article: "The Noble Mission of the Higher Education School"]

[Text] A meeting which took place on 21 January in the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education of the Georgian SSR was devoted to the tasks of higher education at the present level. E. A. Shevardnadze, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian CP, met with the presidents of higher educational institutions and with responsible workers of the republic's ministry of higher education.

Having presented D. I. Chkhikvishvili, who once again was appointed minister of higher and secondary special education in the Georgian SSR, Comrade Shevardnadze spoke about his responsibility toward the future of individuals who will be called upon to train idealistically-convinced specialists with good training for the national economy, science and culture of our country.

Last year, said Comrade Shevardnadze, the Central Committee of the Georgian CP conducted a plenary session that was devoted to the question of work with cadres. Once again the role of higher education was indicated in the training of qualified specialists as well as in educating ideologically-mature highly moral citizens of the Soviet nation.

In recent years higher education in the republic has achieved notable successes in this work but it still does not satisfy present-day requirements. The knowledge that is acquired by young specialists in the higher educational institution sometimes does not ensure a trained solution of important national economic problems and scientifically-based planning.

It is becoming more and more complicated to manage the national economy, science and public life. These problems can be solved only by people who are competent, who have a thorough knowledge and who are ideologically convinced. Today, when our republic and its workers have achieved a certain degree of success in realizing the historical resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and Georgian party organization, the problem of improving the management of the development of the national economy is becoming especially urgent.

We can justifiably be proud of the results of the past economic year. It brought a feeling of satisfaction to many. We are especially inspired by the fact that we are now standing on the threshold of successfully completing the assignments of the current five-year plan. The evident changes in each and every sphere of our lives are especially satisfying.

However, that which has been achieved is only a stage in the forward movement. Whereas it was relatively easy for us to single out resources for fulfilling the plans of the current five-year plan, during the coming 11th and 12th five-year plans our national economy and all of us will have to deal with unforeseeably difficult tasks.

In Georgia in addition to the traditional, new branches of the national economy will be developed. These include electrical technology, electronics, large machine-tool construction and others. There will be a renovation of the Rustav metallurgy and chemical plants, of the Kutaisskiye Automobile Plant imeni S. Ordzhinikidze and the Small Tractor Plant and of the Tbilisi Electric Vehicle Repair Plant imeni J. Stalin. In other words, our republic is on the threshold of a great national economic renewal. This in turn presents the task of developing industry, transportation and building in such a way as to preserve and multiply the natural resources of the republic. This is why there is such urgency in the question of the scientific bases of economic management, of the management of all those important questions posed by life and of the cadres that will be called upon to solve these problems.

The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, "On Measures to Increase the Production of Southern and Subtropical Crops and on the Continued Accelerated Development of Agriculture in the Georgian SSR," has opened up new vistas for the republic. Never before has there been such a large-scale presentation of the question of the development of Georgia's subtropic agriculture. This resolution is being realized complexly through the solution of an entire series of agricultural problems in the republic. This includes the continued expansion of production of subtropical agricultural crops, the building of new facilities for the processing industry, the reequipping of existing facilities and the development of transport and building.

Recently we had some warm parting words for the graduates of the republic's agricultural higher educational institutions. It is they who will have to solve the complex and honored tasks of the party, to become the real organizers of agricultural production and to serve to multiply the resources of our native country.

The responsible tasks of the continued development of industry and agriculture in the republic present new problems. All organizations and institutions in the republic must participate most actively in dealing with these tasks. But first of all the workers in higher education must have their say. They will have to prepare specialists for all branches of the national economy, including the newest.

For this reason we can no longer tolerate a practice existing in the republic resulting in the overproduction of specialists for some branches and in their underproduction in other branches. It is essential to plan specialists in strict accordance with the future development of the national economy so that the errors that were once tolerated would not bring losses in the future. This is what happened when TBIIZhT--the Tbilisi Institute of Engineers for Railroad Transport--was closed 20 years ago. Life has revealed the inconsistency of this decision. Today, with the development of plans to build the Transcaucasus Railroad and with the expansion of the railroad network in the republic we are experiencing an acute need for specialists in railroad transportation.

The republic's Gosplan, the state committee on science and technology, the academy of sciences and the ministry of higher education as well as other interested organizations must jointly concern themselves with the training of the necessary number of specialists of specific professions and with placing them after their graduation from higher education institutions.

On the agenda is the goal of placing higher education in the republic on a new and higher level.

Comrade E. A. Shevardnadze noted the necessity of bringing the work of the departments of higher educational institutions closer to life and to the practical activities of the corresponding branches of the national economy. Frequently they do not give the student the required complex of theoretical knowledge and practical experience. The knowledge found in higher educational institutions should be utilized more broadly to solve the important national economic tasks. While still within the walls of the higher educational institution the young specialist must get the feel of scientific work, of responsibility, of approaching important social and political phenomena as a public servant.

At the meeting special attention was given to questions of further improving the work of technical institutes and to more broadly utilizing this form of study to train middle-link specialists, to introduce forms and methods of education that have been justified in practice and to introduce new methodological aides and textbooks, to further strengthen the scientific-technical and material base of technical institutes and higher educational institutions, and to improve the life and everyday circumstances of students.

Comrade E. A. Shevardnadze said that in order to meet these complex goals our country needs not only professionals who are completely skilled in their field but those who are thoroughly convinced, politically conscious builders of the communist society. The process of forming citizenship in future specialists must begin from their first days of study in the higher education institutions. In order to improve education, higher educational institutions have created departments for ideological-educational work, but as yet there have not been any particularly great results in their work. This work must be improved.

The student body has always been a great public and social force. The Soviet student body is the most progressive part of our society and all of us must strive to make each student an active builder of the communist society, to give him the knowledge to manage complex creation processes and to enable him to implement party goals on a practical level.

The speakers at the meeting, the president of the Georgian Polytechnic Institute imeni V. I. Lenin, A. A. Dzidziguri, the president of the State Pedagogical Institute imeni A. S. Pushkin, N. Sh. Vasadze, the deputy minister of higher and secondary special education of the Georgian SSR, K. S. Chelidze, the president of the Goriiskiy Pedagogical Institute imeni N. Baratashvili, R. S. Kandelaki, the minister of higher and secondary special education of the Georgian SSR, D. I. Chkhikvishvili, warmly thanked the republic's administration for its tireless concern for higher education. They pledged that they would persistently strive to strengthen the successes of higher educational institutions in their work and to raise them to a level that would meet present-day requirements.

Present at the meeting were the secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian CP, G. N. Yenukidze, the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR, O. Ye. Cherkeziya, and the director of the department of education and educational institutions of the Central Committee of the Georgian CP, E. A. Sekhniashvili.

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ANTI-SOVIET BIAS NOTED IN WESTERN STUDIES ON CENTRAL ASIA

Ashkhabad / TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 1 Feb 80 p 3

[Article by M. Annanepesov, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, Turkmen SSR: "Truth Is On Our Side"]

[Text] The publication of the article by P. Redzhepov, K. Muradov, and Ya. Niyazov concerning the two traitors to our Motherland has forced me to pick up my pen. In general, the escapades of these renegades do not deserve any great amount of interest: a traitor is a traitor and he is forced to obey his master. But the fact that foreign intelligence services continue to use traitors as ideological saboteurs against our country and against our republic cannot fail to attract our attention. I would like to dwell somewhat more broadly on this question and to comment on various aspects of the ideological struggle under present-day conditions.

The Soviet nation knows about the Great Patriotic War much more, and to a better degree, than anyone else. I also know about it, and not by hearsay. On 25 June 1941, when I was just a little boy, my father went off to war -- he was a rural teacher and the director of a seven-year school. He died on 25 August of the next year and was buried in the village of Fed'kovo, Temkinskiy Rayon, Smolenskaya Oblast, where I subsequently visited twice.

Just like the rest of the people my own age, during those years I worked day and night. I did everything -- I plowed, and sowed, and cleaned the irrigation ditches, and harvested the grain and cotton. Victory Day found us at work -- we were sowing cotton on the last hectares. Later, as a university student, together with school factfinders, I established that in our small village of only 87 nomad tents, 64 people had failed to return from the front. I still have the list of those who perished. They include many young fellows who had not got married. The people from my village are only a tiny trickle in the stream of 20 million people whose lives were placed on the altar of Victory. Despite everything, our nation withheld precisely because historic truth was on our side, because we all begin our family tree with the Great October [Socialist Revolution], for the cause of which we were ready to make any sacrifices. And if the

American and West German imperialists continue to use the services of traitors like the Berdymuradov brothers, they are doing this not because of the good life: there's nothing to grab for, anymore. However many fishing poles they put in the water, no one bites, no one accepts their lying propaganda.

The "golden age" of capitalism faded into oblivion long ago. The imperialists are going through difficult times. They are dashing back and forth, and from side to side, going to extremes, seizing onto any pretext -- whether it be the "Afghan question" or the "human rights question" -- in order to aggravate the international situation and to torpedo the political detente. At the present time, for example, it is difficult to imagine how the Carter administration will behave tomorrow, or what hypocritical and absurd insinuations it will resort to.

With the aid of all kinds of reactionaries, renegades, and traitors, the imperialists put into motion everything -- distorted information, tendentious illumination of the facts, and downright lies, including the basest and dirtiest provocations. Sometimes, imperialist propaganda attempts to present their hired lackeys as "advanced fighters," "champions of human rights," "critically-minded scientists." In the United States and Western Europe there has been created a broad network of various scientific -- or, to put it more accurately, antiscientific -- centers, institutes, bureaus, and groups for the study of the Soviet Union, including special organizations for studying the Central Asian republics. The workers at those institutions provide false information for the West's propaganda machine, and publish various kinds of literature that is stuffed full of a spirit of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism.

One of the protectors of the younger Berdymuradov, in fact, works as the director of the so-called center for the study of national relations in the USSR, at Columbia University. This person is Edward Allworth, who, about ten years ago, was in Ashkhabad. We at the Institute of History, Academy of Sciences, Turkmen SSR, organized a meeting with him. When he left, he presented to one of our comrades a book that had been published in New York and London under his editorship. The very name reveals its content -- "Central Asia a Hundred Years Under the Dominance of Russia." From beginning to end, this entire "work" is imbued with the spirit of anti-Sovietism. The authors pretend that during those hundred years nothing happened in the history of the peoples of Central Asia, and pretend that there had not been any Great October Socialist Revolution. They completely equate tsarism and the Soviet authority and state that the national and state demarcation in Central Asia and the formation of the union republics was an artificial division of nations, after which they completely lost their state independence. There it is -- the "logic" of the anti-Soviets: everything is topsy-turvy! This is not simply a distortion of the history of the peoples of Central Asia, but a malicious slander against them, a deliberate falsification of that history. It is obvious that the creators of this kind of "science" must have been helped by traitors to their Motherland, and may possibly have even written directly from what they provided.

During the past ten years I happened to take part in the work of many international scientific congresses and symposia. Sometimes I was simply astonished at the incompetence of individual bourgeois scientists and at the disdainful attitude that they had to immutable historical facts and phenomena.

I would like to cite the following fresh example. In August 1979 I happened to take part in the work of the 11th World Congress of the International Association of Political Sciences in Moscow. At one session, among the American scientists dealing with the topic "Nationalities, minorities, and ethnic groups," the speakers included a certain Yuozas Kazlas, who had been born in the Soviet Baltic area. He gave a report entitled "Variety of nationalisms and internationalism." He spoke only about the Soviet Union. The report had been written on the basis of questionnaire information that had been obtained from the mouths of Germans who had emigrated from the Soviet Baltic area. Under no conditions can such a basis for a report provide an objective picture of the national relations in the USSR. According to Yu. Kazlas' concept, the nations of the USSR were divided into various categories depending upon the attitude that they took to the Russian man, and if someone loves his native language, his culture, his music, then he is a nationalist, and if someone is a partner in a mixed marriage, he is a pure internationalist. Soviet scientists, naturally, sharply criticized Yu. Kazlas' pseudoscientific report and reminded him that, according to his logic, the last tsar of Russia, Nikolay II, who had married a German, would also turn out to be an internationalist. I also had the opportunity to speak, inasmuch as Yu. Kazlas spoke tendentiously about the nations of Central Asia.

For centuries the Turkmen nation eked out a meager existence. The interminable feudal wars and pillages led the nation to internecine struggle. The very same antediluvian tools of labor were used in the twelfth century and at the end of the nineteenth century. Nor had there been any noticeable shifts in the social system. There was a very prolonged stagnation.

There was not even any growth in the overall number of Turkmens. We encounter approximately one and the same data in the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century. How could one expect the nation to multiply if its children were struck down by cyclic epidemics of cholera, pernicious malaria, smallpox, and other diseases? Even after annexation to Russia, in 1910, in the villages of Tedzhenskiy and Mervskiy Uyezds, Chardzhouskoye Bekatvo, people were dying in masses and the mortality rate was as high as 50 percent of the total population. Some villages were entirely wiped out by epidemics. One of the tsarist generals predicted a gloomy future for our nation. He wrote, "It is difficult to say what will become of the Turkmens under our authority in the future. The oases of Turkmenia are poor in water. A large population here would be unthinkable. The most likely consequence of that will be the dying out of the Turkmens."

But history willed a different outcome. The Great October recreated everything anew: it freed everyone from the social and national oppression, and provided completely new, previously unknown living conditions. Our nation was reborn. So it turns out that a large population is indeed possible here. Despite the war against fascism, which carried off many young lives, the population in our republic has increased manyfold and is approaching three million.

We shall not discuss the achievements of our nation in the economy, science, culture, education, or medicine. They are well known to everyone. We shall mention our people who bear absolutely no resemblance to those prerevolutionary Turkmens at whose simplicity and ignorance other masters used to laugh. Under conditions of mature socialism, the social homogeneity of Soviet society has been achieved. The overwhelming majority of our people -- irrespective of what a person is, a worker or a peasant, a teacher or a doctor, a city dweller or a villager -- have one and the same interests, which are inseparable from the interests of society as a whole. They thoroughly understand and support with all their heart and soul the wise domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU. Our nation is preparing broadly for the worthy celebration of the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin. Broadly, because all the Soviet citizens have profoundly adopted Leninism, because we are unswervingly executing the behests of the immortal Il'ich, and under the guidance of the CPSU are proceeding confidently along Lenin's course.

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PRESENT ROLE OF TADZHIK WOMEN IN INDUSTRY VIEWED

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by G. Bobosadykova, secretary of the Central Committee of the Tadzhik CP: "Equality With Time"]

[Text] Alive in the memories of some of our older compatriots are the times when the birth of a girl into a Tadzhik family was considered a great misfortune. "It would have been better if you had given birth to a stone--it at least could be used to build a house," the father of the child might have said in his heart to his wife. The mother and daughters lamented their fate ahead of time.

According to ancient tradition, a Tadzhik girl was given in marriage at the age of 9-13. Actually she was sold for bride-money and she became the total property and absolute slave of her husband. Separated from the world by the black net of the yashmak, she worked by the sweat of her brow without leaving the boundaries of the women's half of the house. She was not allowed to speak in the presence of men, let alone to express her own opinions.

Today the voice of the Tadzhik woman speaks authoritatively within her own family as well as when important party and state decisions are made. We cannot imagine a single branch of the national economy of Tadzhikistan where no skillful women's hands are at work. In the republic about 40 percent of the workers are women, and in public education and public health over half are. No matter what assignment is given to them, our great workers apply all of their energy, knowledge and spirit to fulfilling it.

In the republic everyone has heard the names of the weavers Makhfirat Dodobayeva and Bozora Akhmedova, masters of cotton Heros of Socialist Labor Bozorgul Alakhmadova and Zaynab Madzhidova, the milkmaids Hero of Socialist Labor Sufro Bodayeva and Sabokhat Dzhamolova. As leaders in the socialist competition for the ahead-of-schedule fulfillment of the goals of the 10th Five-Year Plan, they have written many wonderful pages into the chronicle of victories. Our contemporaries have mastered many professions today that until recently were considered in the man's domain. They drive tractors and combines and they have become experts at building in order to beautify their cities and kishlaks [village in Central Asia].

The country values the labor, knowledge and talent of the daughters of Tadzhikistan highly. Eighty-five of them have been awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor and over 16,000 have been given decorations and medals.

Now, as the country is beginning to prepare for regular elections for republic and local organs of people's power, we must remember how important V. I. Lenin felt the participation of women in the public and state life of the country. Speaking to women workers on the occasion of the elections to the Moscow Soviet, Lenin wrote in 1920: "Women workers must participate more in elections...It is necessary that the woman worker achieve equality with the man worker not only by law but in life as well. For this it is necessary for women workers to participate more and more in the management of public enterprises and in the administration of the state."

Today the women of our republic, as of the entire Soviet nation, participate widely in the administration of public and state affairs. Twelve of them have been selected for the highest judicial organ in the country--the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; 111 are deputies of the supreme soviet of the republic; and we have 12,000 women in local soviets of workers' deputies.

The woman worker and the mother are truly surrounded by universal love and concern in our country. The state spares no resources to each year increase the network of ante-natal clinics and birthing homes, kindergartens and nursery schools and enterprises for consumer services and public nutrition. This eases housework for women and frees her for public service and for satisfying growing spiritual needs.

The contrast between the situation for Tadzhik women only 5-6 decades ago and what it has now become is striking. But we in the republic are far from being satisfied with the success that has been achieved. After all, life does not stand still; it brings new and sometimes not easily solved tasks.

In Tadzhikistan the population is growing rapidly and this means that labor resources are also growing in cities and especially in kishlaks. At the same time the possibilities for utilizing them in agriculture are limited. Our republic is mountainous and only 7 percent of the territory is made up of valleys that are fit for agriculture and almost all of them have already been assimilated and irrigated. In addition, during the process of mechanizing agricultural production in kolkhozes and sovkhoses manual labor is being replaced by machines, thus freeing some numbers of workers, including women.

The party and state and our planning organs take this into consideration. Power engineering and industry are developing rapidly in the republic. The building of the Nurekskaya GES, the largest in Central Asia, is nearing completion. The powerful Rogunskaya hydroelectric station, aluminum and electrochemical plants and other enterprises of the South Tadzhik territorial-production complex are being built. Many thousands of yesterday's peasants have already joined their fate to them.

But the process of entering the work force is not a simple one. It is accompanied by changes in the habitual way of life as well as by breaks in long-standing ideas and traditions. Sometimes a man cannot immediately find his place and calling. It is even more difficult for a woman, especially at first. And she, of course, needs help in understanding everything. She needs approval with a kind word, support in deed and the expression of the necessary sympathetic attitude and attention. This is the approach that is required of us, after all, by the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, "On Further Improving Ideological, Political-Educational Work," which emphasizes that this work is most effective when it reaches the heart and mind of each individual.

I would like to discuss the work experience that has been collected recently in Tadzhikistan to recruit women living in villages into industrial production. This experience must be dispersed more widely in the republic and it may be useful for other regions of the country as well where labor resources are not being utilized in full measure.

At the Dushanbe textile combine (now the cotton and paper production association), which is now one of the largest in its branch since the 1965 start of operations of its third unit, the new highly-productive equipment remained idle for long periods of time because there was a shortage of manpower. Yes, this was the same manpower of which there was a surplus in the republic.

The information boards of Dushanbe carried the advertisement, "Textile combine needs..." Members of the permanent staff of the enterprise were sent to enlist female workers for the famous textile centers in the country. But all of this did not help.

Things began to move only after we became convinced that the only source of stable cadres for the combine were the neighboring kishlaks. It is true that in order to recruit people for the combine it was necessary to work with them thoroughly in order to convince them that the transition to work in industry was not only necessary to the state but also advantageous to themselves. It was necessary to organize the training of the new professions well.

In order to successfully meet these goals the combine created a permanent staff for the professional orientation of the non-working population. It includes representatives of the party committee and management, of the local committee and komsomol committee and youth advisors. The work of the staff has received support from the entire collective. The results of their work is clearly evident in the changes that have taken place recently in the fates of many residents of the kishlak of Chorbog.

This kishlak is located at the exit from a rocky mountain canyon not far from Dushanbe. There is not much land suitable for agriculture around it and many of the residents have been working in the city for many years. But they were mostly men. It was not traditional for women to leave the kishlak for work.

How did the textile workers begin here? First they made good contact with the kishlak soviet. With its aid they organized meetings with the local residents. They usually began with a presentation by the directors and knowledgeable people of the combine about their enterprise and then detailed answers to questions were given. The meetings concluded with a performance of a concert brigade from the city.

When a great deal was already known about the combine in the kishlak, a group of its residents were invited to see production. The hosts made sure that the group included more girls who had graduated from school and who had not yet decided what they would do, as well as their parents. Also invited were experienced countrymen whose word would be respected.

Soon the Chorbog residents became acquainted with production and with the people working here. They saw how very young people were able to operate complex modern equipment. They were interested in their wages and learned not without surprise that they were rather high. The management showed them their House of Culture and invited them to eat in the plant cafeteria and to drink green tea in the combine's tea room.

The guests liked it here. When they returned home each one told what he saw to his countrymen. Thus, the next time that the textile workers came to Chorbog to talk about the combine they were greeted with more understanding. Even those who earlier might not have approved of women and girls going to work in the combine now agreed that this was worthwhile.

At the combine everyone made sure that those who came to work there felt at home in the worker's collective as quickly as possible. Each group of new workers, mostly recently-graduated young women, were assigned an experienced worker. The youth was transported to work and home on special buses. When the young workers concluded their production studies and received the right to work independently the festive initiation into the working class was celebrated in the home kishlak. Here the first wages were paid them in the presence of their countrymen.

There was a case in which a conflict arose in one family. A young man and wife went to work at the combine, but the mother of the man, a woman of traditional ideas, did not approve. The son and his bride had to leave the house. At the combine the reaction was not a complacent one. Through intercession they were given an apartment in the city. "That is a worker's family. It does not leave its friends in need," said the people of the kishlak.

Soon after this something else happened that strengthened the authority of the combine and its collective in the eyes of the Chorbog residents. During the spring the strong downpours caused mudslides damage in the kishlak. The state and kolkhoz came to the aid of the residents, as did the combine. To the families of all workers whose homes were damaged building materials and monetary funds were allocated for rebuilding. People always respond to good with good. Everyone in Chorbog decided that those who went to work at the combine had not made a mistake.

Thus, the sensitivity of the workers' collective, its responsiveness and kindness became the force that accomplished the job. The textile workers developed such good relations with the residents of other kishlaks as well. As a result, during the last 5 years about 3,500 people came to work at the industrial association. Most of them were women who had not been involved in public production before.

It is not always convenient to transport people from villages to the city for work, and this requires considerable additional expenditures. For this reason the textile workers of Dushanbe decided to try something else--they are opening up affiliates of the association in places with surplus labor. In recent years such affiliates have appeared in the kishlaks of Almasy, Pugus, and Varzob and in the rayon centers of Gissar and Tursunzade. For the local population this is even more convenient--even the mothers of many children go to a job that is close to home.

It should be said that the creation in kishlaks of affiliates of city enterprises is characteristic for today's Tadzhikistan. A particularly great deal of work is being done in this area by the Ministry of Local Industry of the republic. Since the start of the five-year plan it has opened 24 new shops and units in rural regions, 11 of which are based on home labor. This creates additional conveniences for the population. As a rule the affiliates produce consumer products--sown goods, rugs, decorations, national ceramics which are in great demand in the republic.

The recruitment of free labor resources, including women, into public production is not only significant for the national economy. It is also a politically-important goal. In the labor collective the individual receives a good civic, ideological and moral foundation. Working in the labor collective, women acquire the needs and stimulation to increase their knowledge and cultural level and they become used to public life.

It should be said that in the development of activeness in women a large role is played by women's soviets which have been developed here in all labor collectives, rayons, oblasts and republics. They, as organs of public initiative, have instituted many good deeds. They bring up questions of principle related to protecting the rights and interests of women in the corresponding departments.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev evaluated the role of the Soviet woman highly. "Her selflessness and talent," he said at the 25th party congress, "are the sources of many achievements and victories in our homeland." These words can be applied to the women of Tadzhikistan in full measure.

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